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On April 10, 2019, Director of the Event Horizon Telescope 
Project Shep Doeleman announced in a press conference that 
humans have captured the first-ever image of the most elusive and 
mysterious object in the universe: the black hole. More specifi-
cally, the image is of a supermassive black hole in the galaxy M87, 
54 million light-years away from Earth. NASA declared that 
the image “makes history”.1 Among astrophysicists, the image is 
celebrated as a huge step forward in understanding the universe's 
most enigmatic object. But unlike many “extraordinary scientific 
feats” that went unnoticed, this image of a black hole went on to 
capture attention beyond the scientific community. The interest in 
the public sphere is unparalleled. Almost every major news outlet 
reported on the discovery. Through science and technology, 
humans have the ability to see the unseeable, to stare at a light-
sucking abyss from an unfathomable distance. It seems that more 
than a remarkable achievement in astrophysics, the image symbo-
lises something bigger than life. 
The image2 itself, however, is much less impressive. 
After almost 7 minutes of build-up, Doeleman unveiled the long-
awaited image. The blurred image shows a fuzzy orange dough-
nut-shaped ring against a dark background. After a round of 
applause, Doeleman promptly began explaining, to the press 
and many confused viewers like me who were watching the live-
streaming of the conference, what we were seeing. The image, he 
said, depicts the event horizon of the black hole and the hot gas 
swirling around it. Doeleman asserted that the image is the stron-
gest evidence that we have to date of the existence of a black hole. 
He went on to direct the viewer’s attention to the shape of the 
shadow and the lighter patches of the ring underneath the black 
hole, few elements we can discern from the crude image, is consis-
tent with Einstein’s theory of relativity and their predictions.
Within the online community, the image took on a vastly 
different narrative. Netizens were quick to mock the ‘unimpressive’ 
1　Loff, Sarah. “Black Hole Image Makes History; NASA Telescopes Coordinate Observation.” NASA, 
NASA, 10 Apr. 2019
2　Event Horizon Telescope collaboration et al., Image of black hole at the center of galaxy M87, 2019. 
Courtesy of EHT
2
image. In the typical social media manner, Reddit users offered 
their commentary in the form of memes. One meme3 suggested 
the image is the eye of a low-res cat illustration, magnified at 
400%. Another4 is a four-panelled comic strip. The two panels 
on the left show American actor Tobey Maguire in character as 
Peter Parker in the 2000s’ Spider-Man trilogy before and after 
putting on his glasses. In the panels next to them are the blurry 
black hole image and an in-focus, detailed photograph of a lit gas 
stove. These memes5 highlighted the poor quality of the image and 
trivialized the scientific interpretation of the image.
The meaning of an image is ultimately flexible. What 
these two different reactions show, however, is that its meaning 
lies on something else other than the pictorial surface. The same 
blurred image that was hailed as a historic achievement in one 
community can be the mere punchline of a joke for another. 
Images are not inherently meaningful in themselves; underlying  
their meaningfulness is a worldview that makes the image possible 
in the first place. For Doeleman, the black hole image is infor-
mative despite its low resolution because of his trust in the ideas 
behind the image. The most obvious ones might be: His knowledge 
of astrophysics and black holes; Einstein’s theory of general rela-
tivity; the development of telescopes; the Event Horizon Telescope 
project (an array of eight ground-based radio telescopes from 
around the world that act as a Earth-sized telescope to collect 
data from a single celestial target); very-long-baseline interfer-
ometry (the technique used to combine signals from multiple 
radio telescopes); work done by computer scientist Katie Bouman 
and the algorithm she developed to turn the data collected by the 
telescopes into an image; and the physical law of electromagnetic 
waves. For the memers, the image is a joke because they viewed 
the black hole image as a photographic image and, as such, it 
does not fit with their expectations of a digital photograph—
3　Small, Zachary, et al. “The First-Ever Image of a Black Hole Gets the Meme Treatment.” 
Hyperallergic, 12 Apr. 2019
4　Black hole meme: Magnified cat eyes. 2019. Retrieved from DailyMemes. “Black Hole Memes.” 
YouTube, 11 Apr. 2019
5　Black hole meme: Tobey Mcguire. 2019.  Retrieved from DailyMemes. “Black Hole Memes.” 




high-resolution and highly-detailed. It is a joke because it is a 
particularly poor image6 in a time when even live-streaming is 
1080p high-definition. Because a scientific image is expected to 
be ‘informative’—in-focus, sharp and clear, leaving no ambiguity 
as to what is being depicted. Because, science—synonymous with 
reason and rationality—should provide answers with certainty.
Czech philosopher Vilém Flusser proposed a critical 
practice to examine vision which he coined “counter vision”.7     
He suggested that instead of focusing on what is being looked at, 
we should move our point of inquiry to the reasoning and moti-
vations behind certain kinds of image production, or as he put 
it, “inverting the visual intention”.8 Underpinned by the belief 
that the technical process is informative9 in and of itself, counter 
vision looks back at where the image comes from, “turning the 
camera inside out”10 to reveal how a specific vision becomes 
meaningful. A counter vision is not a critique of vision, but a 
“vision of vision”.11 If the intention of vision is the production of 
a meaningful image, the intention of counter vision is to see our 
being-in-the-world, not the world itself.12 
Flusser’s idea of counter vision is inextricably linked to 
two major concepts ‘technical images’ and ‘apparatuses’, which 
are crucial to his philosophy of photography. Counter vision is 
a way to reverse the vector of meaning and decode a technical 
image. Decoding in the Flusserian sense does not mean a semantic 
analysis of the image’s content, but rather an examination of 
how the image is programmed. To him, the latter is a much more 
meaningful inquiry. In his book Into the Universe of Technical Images, 
he elaborates his position:
6　Black hole meme: Was this shit taken on an android?. Apr 10, 2019.
7　In an unpublished essay in collaboration with Andreas Müller-Pohle and Joan Fontcuberta
8　Flusser, Vilém. Countervision, In: "'To document something which does not exist.' Vilém Flusser 
and Joan Fontcuberta: A Collaboration", Flusser Studies, vol 13. May 29, 2017.
9　Flusser Vilém, et al. Into the Universe of Technical Images. University of Minnesota Press. 2011. p.45




 “The semantic and pragmatic dimensions of technical images are identical. To try to 
analyze what they show is to get lost in empty questions: Is the depicted house really out in the 
world, or is it just a surface? Or could the televised image of a politician be the performance 
of an actor imitating that figure? These are not good questions. They permit no answer 
relating to technical images because the questions assume a distinction between true and 
false, and in the universe of technical images, such distinctions have become superfluous. 
Technical images do not show us their meaning; they show us a way we may be directed. It 
is not what is shown in a technical image but rather the technical image itself that is the 
message. And it is a significant, commanding message.”13
This sentiment resonates with the ideas of his collaborator, Joan Fontcuberta. In 
his introduction to Pandora’s Camera, a collection of essays on the technological transfor-
mation of photography, the artist emphasizes the “intentional” nature of the image:
“(Photography) is not reduced to its visibility: visibility is neither the one nor the determi-
nant criterion; also involved are the processes that produce the image and the thoughts that 
sustain it…”14 
In both Into the Universe of Technical Images and Towards the Philosophy of Photo-
graph, Flusser gives detailed descriptions of technical images. “A technical image is an 
image produced by apparatuses”.15 The Flusserian apparatus refers to technologies that 
abstract the world into images. The term implies a tension between the apparatus and 
the operator in the production of image – a “doubly involved” process.16 For Flusser, the 
ordered world, which has previously been organized by texts and mathematical rules, 
has disintegrated into swarms of particles and quanta. What remains is a loose pool of 
discrete data points, moments and actions, where causality is ambiguous and meaning is 
undefined. An apparatus sees the particles as a field of possibility in which to function;17 
it is the human who gives the apparatus an intention to seek a certain pattern, resulting 
in an image with a particular aesthetic. A digital camera is capable of producing images 
of every exposure, every colour temperature at any shutter speed, but the photographs 
humans produce using a digital camera follow certain conventions. What we consider an 
13　Flusser Vilém, et al. Into the Universe of Technical Images. 2011. p.48
14　Stein, Lisa. “Margin of Excess.” 1000words Magazine, 2018, pp. 32–41. Writing about Max Pinckers’ project Margin of Excess, 
Stein referred to Fontcuberta’s essay Pandora’s Camera, which emphasises the intentional nature of images when discussing about the 
technological transformation of photography.




‘informative’ photograph is one that is usually sharp, has good colour contrast, not too 
overexposed or underexposed… which makes up just a small portion of the images the 
camera is capable of capturing. In this way, Flusser’s concept of apparatus share similar-
ities with that of Karen Barad, who defines an apparatus as the physical manifestation 
of a “boundary-drawing practice”18 that reconfigures the different agencies of the world. 
Technical images, being products of apparatuses, inherit their properties. They are not 
surfaces but mosaics assembled from particles.19 Technical images such as photographs, 
films and digital images, exist in an attempt to consolidate these particles in the world 
into images. As such, technical images are inherently grounded in physical reality. Tech-
nical images are ‘of reality’, whether the mosaics result in a comprehensible representa-
tion of reality or not, because they are the product of human’s interaction with reality. 
The world is the prerequisite of technical images; they cannot exist without it.
The apparatus is the key to differentiating between technical images and tradi-
tional images. With technical images, the world is transcoded through an apparatus onto 
an image. Like fingerprints, their significance is automatically reflected on their surface 
where the significance is the cause and the image is the consequence. This indexical 
process is sometimes confused with objectivity. On the contrary, the traditional image 
is symbolic by nature because “‘human beings’ place themselves between the images 
and their significance.”20 In the case of a painting, the world is turned into symbols in 
the head of the painter and transferred to the surface through a paintbrush. To decode 
a traditional image, one has to get inside the head of the painter to understand how 
they encode the world. Hence, when analyzing paintings, it is common for researchers 
to study the painter’s biography. To decode a technical image, however, one has to look 
inside the apparatus because, in the gesture of ‘capturing an image’, the user is limited to 
carrying out the apparatus’ inner instructions. For example, the camera is programmed 
to produce photographs, and every photograph is a realization of one of the possibilities 
contained within the program of the camera. “The apparatus does as the photographer 
desires, but the photographer can only desire what the apparatus can do.”21 In fact, an 
apparatus is not merely a piece of observing equipment; it is designed to simulate specific 
thought processes.“Apparatuses are black boxes that simulate thinking in the sense of a 
combinatory game using number-like symbols.”22 Unless we flip the apparatus inside out 
18　Barad, Karen Michelle. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Duke 
University Press, 2007. p.140 
19　Flusser Vilém, et al. Into the Universe of Technical Images. 2011.
20　Flusser, Vilém. Towards a Philosophy of Photography. Reaktion Books, 1983. p.15
21　Flusser Vilém, et al. Into the Universe of Technical Images. 2011. p.20
22　Flusser, Vilém. Towards a Philosophy of Photography. 1983. p.32
and examine the specific thought processes, we shall never understand the true meaning 
of an image.
 Applying counter vision, this thesis inspects a series of technical images 
with renewed interest. Specifically, the thesis follows a lineage of images depicting water 
splashes. This ordinary yet little understood phenomenon has sparked the interest of 
scientists, artists and image-makers for centuries from Leonardo da Vinci to Arthur 
Mason Worthington to Harold Edgerton and contemporary MIT researchers. Its elusive 
nature makes it difficult to capture while its mesmerizing forms give the viewer an inde-
scribable visual satisfaction once fixed in an image. The phenomenon somehow hits a 
sweet spot of being an appealing challenge for professionals and amateur image-makers 
alike. Images of a splash of water have been created  in many different forms, time after 
time; as a drawing, as a photograph, as a digital image and as a simulation. They epit-
omize humankind’s long-term obsession with images and the intertwined relationship 
between humans, images and the world. 
 Looking at these images of water splashes through the lens of counter 
vision, we peek over the pictorial surface and examine the ‘para-image’. ‘Para’ is a 
prefix appearing in loanwords from Greek meaning ‘beyond’ or ‘beside’. Thus, a para-
image is what is left when we scratch away the image surface. A para-image moves the 
focus away from the often seductive optical aspects of the image and examines different 
notions of images. This includes, but is not limited to: philosophy, cultural ideas, scien-
tific theories and technological knowledge that sustains the image surface and give 
it meaning. It concerns perception, experience, production, dissemination and other 
aspects of images that are crucial to its agency. To put it another way, para-images are 
the results of apparatuses. This time, Giorgio Agamben’s definition of apparatus comes 
in handy, in which he defines it as “literally anything that has in some way the capacity 
to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, 
opinions, or discourses of living beings.”23
By frequently doing double-takes on these images, we see a pattern of how 
human beings situate themselves with images and the world. Apparatuses inspire certain 
way of image-making. The images in turn spark new thinking about images and some-
times new ontologies. This thesis unveils the para-images of seven depictions of water 
splashes by laying out ideas crucial to the significance of these images, as well as other 
images that operate in similar manners.  In an attempt to give shape to these paradigms 
of thought, the thesis identifies, drawing on Agamben’s term, three apparatuses: (1) the 
23　Agamben, Giorgio. What Is an Apparatus?: and Other Essays. Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, Stanford University 
Press, 2009. p.14
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representational apparatus (2) the phenomenological apparatus 
and (3) the generative apparatus. 
The three apparatuses, although to some degree are 
informed by technology available at the time (e.g. cameras, 
computers, artificial intelligence, etc), are not limited to a partic-
ular era or medium. There is overlap among apparatuses; each can 
be seen as a commentary on others. A photograph may be given 
significance through different reasoning, as in the case of the 
black hole image. On the other hand, the same medium can switch 
between apparatuses. A digital image can be created with a repre-
sentational intention24 while a painting can be generative. A good 
example is Clare Strand’s The Discrete Channel with Noise: Algorithmic 
Painting; Destination.25 For the artwork, she let her husband picked 
a photograph from her archive, broke it down into a coded grids 
and filled in with a number corresponding to the brightness of the 
area. He would then communicate the number and she would fill 
up a canvas, painting grid by grid. 
Moreover, we cannot trace the apparatus back to a 
single point in time, nor can we easily attribute a linear causality 
among ideas. Ideas and images feed on each other. In fact, they are 
a loose pool of particles, which combine to form a partial picture 
when we begin to draw boundaries. After examining the three 
apparatuses, a blurry picture begins to appear, one that points 
to the displacement of human vision in the process of image-
making and the ever-dissolving boundary between the image and 
the world. These will be further elaborated later on in the thesis, 
which is made up of a collection of essays contemplating the 
para-images of water splashes in different visual forms.
This thesis does not claim to provide an unambiguous 
and highly detailed para-image, but rather works to acknowledge 
the meaningfulness of a blurred-image, observed using a rele-
vant apparatus. This thesis also does not discriminate between 
Flusser’s, Agambem’s and Barad’s definition, using the term 
‘apparatus’ flexibly. In many points of this thesis, an apparatus 
24　RochlitzVR, Rendering of Gothic Period using Blender, circa 2017
25　Strand, Clare. The Discrete Channel with Noise. 2018. Courtesy of the artist.
refers to the boundary-drawing practice and the physical components of the image-
making device, the technology and the cultural ideas surrounding it, the visual inten-
tion and everything else related to the production of an image. The three definitions are 
inseparable. An apparatus is both the ideology and the physical manifestation of those 
ideas. In short, this thesis refuses the reduction of technical images to their inscription as 
a visual form,26 and apparatus to its technology. 
Technical images have become a core component in our relationship with the 
world, or as Daniel Rubenstein elaborates in Photography After Philosophy: “Photography 
is the visual figuration of a new layer of consciousness—in which new relationships 
to space and time, and therefore new categories of thought, play, art and agency are 
emerging.”27 To talk about para-images is to problematize our conventional expecta-
tions and trust in images. Our relationships with images—whether it is  one built on 
trust or skepticism—are emblematic of various kinds of epistemological, ontological 
and visualizing systems (Plato’s or Descartes’ or Kant’s or Merleau-Ponty’s or Foucault’s 
or Baudrillard’s or Flusser’s or Hansen’s or Barad’s).28 Which apparatus is dominant? 
Which apparatus has the hegemony to decide what type of image and aesthetics is mean-
ingful? How do we formulate the triangular relationship between human beings, images 
and the world under each apparatus? How do we situate ourselves in it all? Images do 
not live in a vacuum; they are tied to our belief systems, to particular ways of relating to 
the world. The Flusserian apparatus can produce as many images as the program allows, 
but whether an image is meaningful or significant to us is supported by our worldviews. 
By investigating para-images, we excavate a world of ideas. In short: in every image, 
there is a world.
26　Lugon, Olivier. and Joschke, Christian.“Transbordeur: Photography, History, Society Annual Journal.” Transbordeur Magazine, 
Transbordeur Magazine
27　Rubinstein, Daniel. Photography After Philosophy. 2016. p.4









“When the water is impacted, it opens and the impacting drop 
bounces back. The water that was open, closes back as a wave 
converging toward the place where the drop jumped up. All this 
water in reflective motion impacts on itself and jumps (following 
the first drop) and climbs behind it as if embracing it.”29 The 
Renaissance Man Leonardo DaVinci describes a water splash in 
his notebook. This ordinary phenomenon—in fact so ordinary 
that it is mundane—has been the interest of Western scientists 
and artists since time immemorial. It is a phenomenon that has 
been studied time after time for its sophisticated, fluid mechanics 
as much as for its elusive beauty.
Motivated by his interest in hydraulics and mechanics, 
DaVinci documented many fluid phenomena in texts and drawings 
dotted throughout his notebooks. In Codex Atlanticus, He  made 
various crude drawings30 to record his observations of the impact 
of a water drop as it collides with a body of water. One depicts a 
teardrop-shaped jet of water, another shows a side-view of the 
moment right after the impact, in which an organic, beaded form 
protrudes from a dark hole in the center of a rippled surface. 
Codex Atlanticus is the largest set of bound notes by DaVinci. Many 
of his notes written in the fifthteenth century still exist today, 
largely due to conservation efforts. Codex Atlanticus, along with its 
seven other cousins, including Codex Leicester and Codex Madrid, 
are highly sought after by collectors. There is not a shortage of 
buyers who would pay an obscene amount of money to get their 
hands on it, one of them being Bill Gates, who paid over $30 
million for Codex Leicester in 1994 at a Christie’s auction.31 It is not 
an overstatement to say that his notes have attained the status of 
a cult object: a tangible, paper Holy Grail.
Flipping through the codex at the Warburg Institute in 
London, I stared in awe at the power that these drawings hold. 
The sketches are so simple, direct and nonchalantly drawn, yet 
29　Macagno, Enzo. Libro dell'acqua. The University of Iowa, Iowa Institute of Hydraulic Research, 
2006
30　DaVinci, Leonardo. Drawings from Codex Atlanticus. circa 1480
31　"Christie, Manson and Woods, sale 8030, 11 November 1994". Christies.com. 11 November 1994. 
Retrieved 23 July 2013.
30
they represent an unparalleled significance to the Western world. 
One can easily explain my wonder by attributing it to our obses-
sion for objects, or the aura of DaVinci as an all-round genius—
an image firmly constructed by Western rhetoric, but I believe 
its significance is not expressed simply by the monetary value 
a capitalistic system assigns to it. There is more about these 
manmade inscriptions that points to a fundamental belief system. 
At the minimum, the connection is strong enough for Enzo O. 
Macagno, a noted American hydraulician who has willingly 
spent decades compiling and deciphering fluid mechanics related 
texts and drawings from the codices. He published the findings 
in Libro dell'acqua,32 from which I quote DaVinci’s description of a 
water splash.
When looking at a drawing from Western culture, we 
tend to subconsciously evaluate its realism, comparing what is 
depicted on its surface to our lived experience. For what reason 
do we believe a doodle by a famous man represents how water 
behaves? And why do we naturally assume a connection between 
the inscription and reality, when traditional images such as 
drawings are a personal system of encoded signifiers, construed 
by the author to depict the world? Before we move on to tech-
nical images and their apparatuses, we need to understand the 
para-images of surfaces and inscriptions.
If we are to find any connection between Plato's thinking 
and today's image culture, it would be in his dichotomy between 
the image and the real. In the Allegory of the Cave,33 he argued 
that pure reason is the only way to enlightenment. He warned 
us about the phantasms of the caves. His idealism distinguishes 
essence from appearance, the intelligible from the sensible, ideas 
from images. He is famously skeptical of images. Plato character-
ised the distinction between the making of likeness (“eikons”) and 
the making of semblances (“phantasm”) in Sophist. The dialogue 
demonstrated that a phantasm is a deceitful copy of reality; an 
imitator that looks like reality but knows nothing of reality. His 
32　Macagno. Libro dell'acqua. 2006
33　Coxcie, Michiel. Plato's Cave, circa 16th century
33
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theory establishes an oppositional tension between image and reality, in which images 
are malignant parasites preying on reality.34 We do not know if Plato would have a 
different conception of images had he encountered a technical image, but his position 
with regards to the traditional image is clear—an image is an obstacle, blocking us from 
the true essence of the world. 
This harsh critique of images poses a pesky intellectual challenge that every 
philosopher who succeeds him has had to confront if they wanted to use the technique of 
observation in their epistemology. As much as Plato wanted his fellow humans to pursue 
the true essence of things, we live in the visible world, in which images are an important 
medium to communicate our realities. Hence, to secure a trust in image surfaces, 
Western philosophy began a longstanding project that I like to call the ‘rationalization 
of human sight’. Classical thinkers from Euclid to Descartes have attempted to provide 
alternative theories to rebuild the certainty of human sight and our trust in images.
One of their crucial undertakings was to put pure reason back into image. 
Euclid, though he was not motivated by this exact aim, brought mathematics into the 
study of light. At his time, nothing was deemed more rational than mathematics as a 
way of understanding reality.35 In Euclidean optics, light rays are treated as geometrical 
problems. Euclid laid down seven postulates on the correlation between viewing angles 
and the size of the images. His theory of the viewing angle explains the reflective proper-
ties of light. Armed with these geometric principles, it is easy to work out the reflected 
image based on the knowledge that light rays travel in straight lines. Euclidean optics 
shows that our vision is no more than a point-to-point translation of light rays.
The ancient Greek understanding of human vision remains largely inaccurate. 
Euclid, Ptolemy and Plato asserted that vision occurs when rays emanate from the eyes 
and are intercepted by visual objects,36 an idea known as intromission theory. The theory 
states that if an object was seen directly, it was by ‘means of rays’ coming out of the eyes 
and again falling on the object. This thinking was likely inspired by Greek mythology37 
and the observation of the gleaming ‘fire’ in animals' eyes at night. The view was accepted 
by mainstream thinkers until Arab mathematician Alhazen provided an alternative 
theory. He is the first scholar to explain that vision occurs when light bounces on an object 
and then is directed to one’s eye.38 Alhazen also published the 7-volume Book of Optics in 
34　Plato. Sophist. 266d
35　“Plato on Mathematics.” MacTutor History of Mathematics Archive
36　O'Regan, J. Kevin. “Ancient Vision.” J. Kevin O'Regan
37　In ancient Greek mythology, Aphrodite made the human eye out of the four elements. She lit the fire in the eye which shone out from 
the eye and made sight possible.
38　J. Al-Khalili, “In retrospect: Book of optics”, Nature 518. 2015. pp. 164–165
the eleventh century, in which the pinhole camera and the camera 
obscura are described.
Descartes built on the theories of his predecessors and 
further consolidated the connection between mathematics, geom-
etry and optics. His illustration of a blind man39 quite succinctly 
summarizes his optics. The illustration shows a blindfolded man 
walking with sticks and seeing with his hands. He compared the 
human eye to a camera obscura: an equipment in which the light 
that shone from an object travelled in a straight line into the 
apparatus, forming an image. “Rays of light are nothing other 
than the lines alone which this action tends.”40 For Descartes, the 
mechanics of light are universal to every pair of eyes. The mind’s 
job is simply, as explained by the crossed sticks in his illustration, 
to invert the image formed by the camera obscura to form an 
upright image that humans are used to. Taking it one step further, 
Descartes alluded to the medieval distinction of light,41 ‘lux’ and 
‘lumen’, giving his optics extra metaphysical weight as he explains 
reflection and refraction. He characterised ‘lux’ as the light of 
the mind42 and ‘lumen’ as the corporeal light that shines through 
objects. One could speculate that Descartes’ interest in studying 
reflection and refraction was as much motivated by curiosity as by 
his metaphysical conception of light. His vocabulary is sprinkled 
with colourful metaphors that explore the connection between 
natural light and truth. Descartes equates truth with things that 
are clear and distinct,often using light as a synonym of reason. He 
explains that God is the truth because “it is manifest by the natural 
light that all fraud and deception depend on some defect”.43 
The invention of the camera obscura provided artists a 
new way to produce images. The world is now partially abstracted 
through an apparatus rather than directly translated by the human 
mind into a drawing. Drawings produced under this practice carry 
39　Illustrations from 1724 Edition of Descarte’s La Dioptrique
40　Descartes, Rene. La Dioptrique. 1724
41　Descartes.  La Dioptrique. 1724
42　Grosseteste, Robert, and Clare C. Riedl. On Light (De Luce). Marquette University Press, 2000. 
“Light that extends along with itself the spirituality of the matter of the first body” 
43　Garber, Daniel. Descartes, René. In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
London: Routledge. 1998, 2003. Retrieved September 12, 2019
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the instruction of the apparatus. The popularisation of the camera obscura as a drawing 
aid during the Renaissance further imposed the philosophy of classical optics onto the 
pictorial surface.44 Trust in the image surface continued to flourish with the invention 
of perspective and chiaroscuro during the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth century. 
These techniques provided consistent rules to render the world onto image surfaces 
regardless of the viewer’s position. Bruno Latour suggests that the invention of perspec-
tive is important because of “its logical recognition of internal invariances through all 
the transformations produced by changes in spatial location.”45 He concluded that the 
drawing technique creates an “optical consistency.”46 Linear perspectives established a 
two-way relationship between object and figure in which the world can be translated by 
the human illustrators in a fixed manner. Linear perspective and chiaroscuro supply a 
geometric stability to pictures, unifying the ways that traditional images in the Renais-
sance were made. The result is the rationalization of image surface.
“In the West, even if the subject of the printed text were unscientific, the printed picture 
always presented a rational image based on the universal laws of geometry. In this sense the 
Scientific Revolution probably owes more to Albrecht Dürer than Leonardo Da Vinci.” 47 
All these culminate to one concept: representationalism. Karan Barad 
summarises representationalism concisely as: “The assumption that language was a 
transparent medium that transmits a homologous picture of reality to the knowing 
mind finds its parallel in a scientific theory that takes observation to be the benign 
facilitator of discovery, a transparent lens passively gazing at the world.”48 Optical 
consistency fortifies the representational connection between image surface and the 
world it depicts. Behind every image surface is a dialogue with representation, in one 
way or another, aligning with or escaping from it, regardless of the author’s intention. 
Every image surface bears the burden of representation.49 Ironically, representation-
alism comes with a side effect: the suspension of reality. An image surface allows objects 
in the world to be isolated, translated onto a surface, examined and manipulated. A 
44　Italian scholar Giambattista della Porta published a clear description of the camera obscura in a book entitiled Magiae naturalis libri 
XX in quibus scientiarum naturalium divitiae et deliciae demonstrantur
45　Latour, Bruno. “Drawing Things Together.” The Map Reader, 2011, pp. 65–72
46　Summarising William M. Ivins and Samuel Y. Edgerton’s analysis of linear perspective, Latour explain the term as “a regular avenue 
through space”. The consistency allows the world to be transcribed onto a surface without much corruption.
47　Edgerton, S. “The Renaissance artists as a quantifier”.  In M.A. Hagen (Ed.)  The Perception of Pictures, vol. 1, New York: Academic 
Press. 1980. p.190
48　Barad, Karen Michelle. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Duke 
University Press, 2007. p.97
49　Tagg, John. The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories. Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
subject and object dichotomy. The classical drawer suspends 
himself above reality, gazing into the world as an independent 
observer, exerting the power of vision over earthly beings.
Representationalism also extends to extraterrestrial 
beings: from the water drawings in DaVinci’s notebook to the 
moon drawings of Galileo. Galileo’s drawing50 in 1609, a set of 
six watercolours, is widely regarded as the first realistic depic-
tion of the topographical structure of the moon. His use of chiar-
oscuro accentuated the structure of lunar mountains and craters, 
debunking the common myth that the moon is a perfect sphere 
with patches of discoloration.51 Yet, we have long been gazing 
up at our closest celestial neighbour and throwing guesses at its 
appearance. Different cultures popularize different interpreta-
tions of the moon’s markings, even within Western culture, there 
have been controversies as to what the moon really looks like. 
Some cultures see the dark pattern as holes and fantasize a moon 
made of green cheese. The Haida people saw a boy trapped in the 
moon with a stick. The ancient Chinese identified a rabbit upon 
observing the markings and conceived a beautiful epic that ends 
with a goddess living in a moon palace.52 Myths aside, Chinese 
scholars had less superstitious interest in the moon, focusing 
rather on tidal waves, the lunar cycle and other moon-related 
phenomena. These observations were mostly communicated 
through text.53 There tends to be less emphasis on visual repre-
sentations in epistemological literature compared to their 
Western counterparts. Representation remains by and large an 
artistic device reserved to paintings and fiction. 
The seemingly inherent connection between image 
surface and reality in Western culture is constructed and histor-
ical. The investigation of the classical Western notion of the 
50　Galilei, Galileo. Drawings of the Moon, November-December 1609
51　Lynch, Michael, and Samuel Y. Edgerton. “Abstract Painting and Astronomical Image Processing.” 
The Elusive Synthesis: Aesthetics and Science Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1996, pp. 
103–124
52　The Fable of Chang-e, the Chinese goddess of the moon, can be traced back to classic text 
Huainanzi (《淮南子》: 「姮娥竊以奔月，悵然有喪，無以續之。」).
53　Chinese classic text Lunheng (《論衡》) by Wang Chong mentioned the phenomenon of tidal wave 
(「濤之起也，隨月盛衰。」) Shen Kuo’s Dream Pool Essay (《夢溪筆談》) proposed that the moon is 
a non-luminous body (「月本無光」).
50
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image surface deserves an entire book on its own, but for now, the lyrics of a jazz classic 
succinctly summed up the para-images of the surface: “Said it is only a paper moon, 
sailing over a cardboard sea, but it wouldn't be make believe if you believed in me.”54
54　Excerpt of the lyrics of It’s Only a Paper Moon sung by Ella Fitzgerald. There are many interpretations as to what the lyrics mean. 
Some say paper moon refers to the illusion of romance. Others are reminded of carnival photos of people posing on a paper moon 







Arthur Mason Worthington spent most of his career studying 
water splashes. In the English physicist’s book The Splash of a Drop 
published in 1895, he retold a school-boy account he had heard 
twenty years ago about the phenomenon: ink drops of the same 
size falling from the same height had always made the same 
mark.55 What followed was decades of curious observations of 
the phenomenon, which materialized in a series of drawings. 
These drawings of liquid stretching,56 perfectly symmetrical and 
sharp, are so elegant there is almost a painterly quality to them. 
They have the kind of Platonian beauty, one that associates truth 
with beauty.57 Or perhaps this beauty is imagined: he is simply 
following the lineage of anatomists, botanists and microscopists 
before him, who took on the Baconian mission of documenting 
the world in its categories and its regularities.
In order to capture the fleeting phenomenon that occurs 
“in the twinkling of an eye,”58 Worthington devised an elaborate 
observation setup. He designed a device consisting of a Leyden jar, 
a timing sphere and an observation platform of water drops made 
up of mechanical parts. Worthington conducted his experiment 
in a relatively dark room. When he dropped the timing sphere 
from above, breaking the electrical circuit within the device, the 
jar would produce a bright flash of light. In that split second, the 
splash revealed itself. For years, Worthington would rely on the 
afterimage burned onto his retina by the flash to illustrate the 
fascinating forms. By adjusting the height of the timing sphere 
in small increments, Worthington was able to produce a freeze-
frame sequence of water splashes a thousandth of a second apart.
Worthington probably learnt about afterimage through his 
working experience with Hermann Ludwig Ferdinand von 
Helmholtz in his Berlin laboratory.59 Von Helmholtz is the father 
of neuroscience. In 1864, he published the first volume of his 
55　Worthington, A. M. Splash of a Drop. 1895. 
56　Worthington, A. M. First Series. Circa 1985. Drawings of a Drop of Mercury 0.15" in diameter 
falling 3" on to a smooth glass plate
57　Plato, The Symposium, Penguin Books, 1951.
58　Worthington, A. M. The Splash of a Drop. 1895. p.1. “The splash of a drop is a transaction which is 
accomplished in the twinkling of an eye…”
59　“Obituary Notice, Fellow: Worthington, Arthur Mason.” Monthly Notices of the Royal 
Astronomical Society, vol. 77, Feb. 1917, p. 308.
56 pioneering work on visual perception, the Handbook of Physiological Optics. Central to his 
work is the study of the correlation between apperception and perception. As it turns 
out, very few sensations are one-to-one to perceptions. What one senses does not get 
directly translated into perception. The external object that creates a stimulus in the 
nervous system is interpreted and produces a vastly different perception that cannot 
be explained away simply by studying the sensory input. Helmholtz called this process 
transduction and sensory coding. One common phenomenon that Helmholtz studied 
is the afterimage. An afterimage is an image that continues to appear in the eyes after 
a period of exposure to the original image, sometimes as a result of colour fatigue. It 
happens to us often after prolonged looking at a colour, fatiguing a certain type of 
colour-processing cone cells in the retina. When we move our field of vision, those cone 
cells under-expresses themselves, resulting in a color patch of a complementary colour. 
Staring at a green rectangle for a long time will cause a magenta afterimage after the 
original stimulus is removed. An image continues to exist in our vision even though the 
stimuli has disappeared. His study of optical illusions reveal that the human eye is indeed 
not as optically reliable as Cartesian optics suggested. He concluded that vision is a form 
of unconscious inference based on previous experience.60 
Cartesian optics are more idealistic than true to human vision. Scientists have 
discovered many more phenomena after Helmholtz, such as blind spots, visual hallucina-
tion and colour constancy, that cannot be explained by classical optics. French ophthal-
mologist Louis Émile Javal reported in the late nineteenth century that our eyeballs 
constantly make short, rapid movements (saccades) when reading along a line of text. A 
landmark study published in 1976 led by scientists John K. Stevens61 in which subjects 
were anaesthetized but kept awake further investigate the phenomenon. With the exper-
imental subjects’ eyes open but unable to move, their vision actually faded when they 
could not re-stimulate neurons through eye movement. Saccades are essential to vision, 
yet curiously enough our vision is relatively stable despite the eyes’ short and jerky 
motions. Psychologist and writer Susan Blackmore sums up the more modern under-
standing of vision quite well:
“Vision is an illusion in the following sense—to the extent that people believe that seeing 
means absorbing lots of information and building up a picture inside their heads that they 
then consciously experience they are wrong. SO vision is not the way it seems to be… neither 
60　von Helmholtz, Hermann. Handbuch der physiologischen Optik. 3. Leipzig: Voss. 1925
61　Stevens, John K., et al. “Paralysis of the Awake Human: Visual Perceptions.” Vision Research, vol. 16, no. 1, 1976.
28 29
the show nor the observer can be found in the brain; it simply is not organized that way, and 
has no need of them.” 62 
Light is also more complex than what previous philosophers had thought. The 
infamous double-slit experiment has offered explanations for a variety of hypotheses, 
first in Newtonian physics and later in quantum mechanics. There are many versions of 
the experiment, some are done with different emission sources and other times only as a 
thought experiment (gedanken), but the first, performed with light by Thomas Young in 
1801, was conducted to demonstrate the wave theory of light. The corpuscular theory of 
light set forward by Descartes—an alternative to Young’s—was the dominant theory 
of light propagation at the time. It states that light is made up of small discrete particles 
called ‘corpuscles’ travelling in straight lines. Young proved in his experiments that light 
can exhibit wave-like properties, as evidenced by the interference pattern on the screen. 
The discovery of diffraction by Francesco Maria Grimaldi two centuries earlier and 
Young’s interference pattern provide a counter argument to classical optics where light is 
expressed in lines, figures and angles and calculated using the logical tool of geometry.
In Spring 1894, at the dawn of photography, Worthington decided to redo his 
experiment with a camera and finally succeeded in fixing the droplet’s splash in pictures. 
Upon seeing the photographs, he finally realised how wrong he had been with his draw-
ings. The water splashes were much less regular than he had presented in the drawings. 
The perfect symmetry was shattered. In his book, he confessed that he was blinded by 
his own judgement—an “Auto Splash”:
“It remains only to speak of the greater irregularity in the arms and rays as shown by the 
photographs. The point is a curious and interesting one. In the first place I have to confess 
that in looking over my original drawings I find records of many irregular or unsymmetrical 
figures, yet in compiling this history it has been inevitable that these should be rejected, if 
only because identical irregularities never recur. Thus the mind of the observer is filled with 
an ideal splash—an ‘Auto Splash’—whose perfection may never be actually realized.” 63 
Like many scientists of his time, Worthington’s methodology was fashioned 
after the Baconian method. Put forward in Bacon's book Novum Organum, the method 
advocated methodical observation of facts as a means of studying and interpreting 
natural phenomena. Also known as empiricism, he postulated the dismissal of all prej-
62　Blackmore, Susan. “A Grand Illusion.” Consciousness, 2005, pp. 50–65
63　Worthington, A. M. The Splash of a Drop. 1895, p.74
udices and preconceptions by following three main steps: the 
description of facts, the tabulation and classification of those facts 
and hypothesis of causal relationship between the facts. In the 
nineteenth century, however, the new discoveries of inconsistent 
human vision and the duality of light both threaten the certainty 
of science. Human vision is an illusion permeated by subjective 
judgements. At this crucial moment, the not-so-coincidental 
invention of photography comes into science conveniently to reaf-
firm the certainty of Baconian knowledge.
Photography restores the optical consistency of the 
surface established by camera obscura and linear perspective in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth century while ensuring an unparal-
leled mechanical objectivity to document reality that a human 
subject cannot compete with. It is not surprising that since its 
developmental stage, when Henry Fox Talbot was experimenting 
with images produced solely by the action of light and chemistry 
in his backyard,64 photography has been assigned this mission 
of objective representation. Fox Talbot named his first commer-
cially published book illustrated with photographs The Pencil of 
Nature.65 Photography symbolizes everything human vision is not. 
Mechanical seeing counteracts the flaw of the human eye. Its fast 
shutter freezes time, its long exposure reveals imperceptible move-
ments. Or as Fox Talbot put it: “The eye of the camera would see 
plainly where the human eye would find nothing but darkness.”66 
Underpinned by this representational demand, it is a 
natural development that photography’s automatic nature is 
highlighted in the early writings of photography. It is in fact a 
central idea mainstream photo theorists must engage with at the 
infancy of photography. Before digital photography, photography 
was thought to be unique because it is THE ‘unmediated’ image. 
Theorists have given this characteristic many names. Susan 
Sontag called it “trace”,67 Rosalind Krauss used “indexicality”68 
64　Henry Fox Talbot, Wim. A Cascade of Spruce Needles, 1839 (photogenic drawing negative)
65　Henry Fox Talbot, William. The Pencil of Nature. Longmans, London. 1844.
66　Henry Fox Talbot. The Pencil of Nature. 1844
67　Sontag, Susan. On Photography. Penguin Classics, 2014.
68　Krauss, Rosalind. “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America.” October 3 1977. 68-81.
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and Roland Barthes named it a “ message without a code.”69 A photograph, they argue, 
simply registers what is in front of the camera. An image is drawn automatically by 
nature. For the first time, the image of the world is formed automatically, without the 
creative intervention of man.70 The photographic subject ‘touches’ the light-sensitive 
surface and leaves an imprint of its presence, thus producing an image that is free of 
style, free of code. It is “the object itself.”71 It is what supports the idea of a “truth claim”, 
the term coined by Tom Gunning to describe the prevalent belief that traditional photo-
graphs accurately depict reality. A new optical consistency, now rooted in the index-
icality and visual accuracy of photographs, rekindles the connection between surface 
and reality— realism, a Western obsession that keeps haunting images even today. It 
gives the entire tradition of documentary photography, from Dorothea Lange’s work of 
the Great Depression and Robert Capa’s photographs of the Second World War right 
through to modern photojournalism, weight and significance.  
Photographic vision, in its early years, emblematized a distrust in the human 
eye. For a long time, the aesthetic of photography has been defined as the antithesis of 
human vision. Unlike inconsistent human vision, the camera translates whatever in front 
of it onto an image in a one-to-one fashion. The camera renders time and space in a 
much higher resolution than the human eye. It freezes quick motions, it magnifies micro-
structures. A camera is thought to be a prosthetic to human vision, capturing what the 
human eye cannot see. Thus, photographs are expected to be in-focus, sharp and highly 
detailed. In a nutshell, photography is, like many exhibition titles72 have suggested, 
seeing the invisible.
Looking backwards, the stroboscopic photographs of Berenice Abbott,73 
commissioned by MIT, that document the principles of physical science, and Harold 
Edgerton’s high-speed photography of splashes and bullets74 seem like a logical develop-
ments in the medium’s history. For more than forty years, Harold Edgerton and James 
R. Killian worked as a team: one taking the photographs and the other writing about 
the ‘meaning of the pictures.’ In the introductory essay of their photobook Flash! Seeing 
the Unseen by Ultra-high speed photography, Killian boasted about the superiority of their 
69　Barthes, Roland. 1977, The Rhetoric of the Image in Heath, Stephen (Trans) Image, Music, Text. New York: Hill and Wang. p32
70　Bazin, Andre, and Hugh Gray. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” Film Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4, 1960, pp. 4–9.
71　Ibid.
72　Once Invisible (1967), an exhibition of science photographs curated by John Szarkowski, opens at the Museum of Modern Art, NY; 
Beyond Vision (1984), an exhibition and book by John Darius for Britain’s National Museum of Photography, Film and Television includes 
100 photographs that “provide information inaccessible to the human eye.”; Brought to Light: Photography and the Invisible 1840–1900 
(2009), an exhibition curated by Corey Keller, opens at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art.
73　Abbott, Berenice. A Gold Ball Bouncing Along a Hard Flat Board, Loses Energy. Where Has All the Energy Gone? 1958-61.
74　Edgerton, Harold E. Bullet through Apple. 1964
technology over a conventional camera75 and that high-speed 
photography shows that “beyond the horizon of human vision lies 
a whole world of such unseen rapid motion.”76 The electric spark, 
lasting about one millionth of a second, allowed them to access a 
superhuman temporal resolution. The technique not only enabled 
the duo to freeze water splashes in a motion arc, but also to liter-
ally capture the blink of an eye.77 
In his essay, Killian continued to highlight the capability 
of high-speed photography by recounting the effort photogra-
phy’s pioneer Fox Talbot had exerted to make a ‘still’ picture of 
moving objects. Fox Talbot, who patented his method of instan-
taneous photography in 1851, created an ‘unblurred’ picture of 
a clipping from the London Times by using a studio setup that 
combined a rapidly revolving disk and a spark-producing Leyden 
battery. The method formed the basis of ‘stroboscopic seeing’, 
in which a flash unit78 creates pulses of light at miniscule inter-
vals, allowing a moving object (a rotating fan for example) to 
appear momentarily frozen in time to the naked eye. Stroboscopic 
photography is a technique of time manipulation, and as such it 
acquires the aesthetics of stillness. The genius of a ‘still’ photo is 
emphasised repeatedly in the essay.
“It is the genius of high-speed photography, both still and motion, 
to reduce and clarify the fuzzy world of the transient and 
fast...They provide a unique and literal transcript of that time 
world beyond the threshold of our eyes.” 79
Killian credited the invention of stroboscope in 1832 to 
the Belgian physicist Joseph Plateau and Austrian mathematician 
Simon von Stampfer. Plateau made many original contributions 
to physiological optics. His thesis was a remarkable study of the 
75　Edgerton, Harold E. A Mechanical Shutter in Action. circa 1939. A series of pictures, taken at the 
rate of 4,200 per second, on a high-grade mechanical shutter. (scanned from Flash! Seeing the Unseen 
by Ultra-high speed photography.
76　Edgerton, Harold Eugene, and James Rhyne Killian. Flash! Seeing the Unseen by Ultra High-Speed 
Photography. C.T. Branford Co., 1954
77　Edgerton, Harold E. Quick As A Wink. circa 1939
78　Directions for assembling a single-light high-speed photography devised by Harold E. Edgerton






properties of the impressions which light can exercise on the eye, 
studying the effect of colour on the human retina and the distor-
tion of moving images. In 1829, his passion for experimentation 
pushed him to carry out a very dangerous experiment of directly 
staring at the sun for approximately twenty-five seconds.80 It 
was rumoured that the experiment was related to his eventual 
blindness in 1843. He retained reasonable vision until two years 
before his blindness. Within those two years, he suffered “from 
blurring of vision with many black spots floating about in front 
his sight.”81 Often called the ‘martyr of science’, Plateau lost his 
sight in the pursuit to master human vision. As he learnt about 
the physiology of the eye, his retina slowly detached, the remnants 
forming black spots, blocking his own vision.
Time manipulation creates its own blindness. The 
emphasis of a sharp picture devalues ambiguous surfaces. 
Shot after shot, the experiment continues until a sharp image 
is produced. Motion blur is unacceptable, fuzzy images are 
discarded. After staring at Edgerton’s Milk Drop Coronet,82 I see 
the afterimage of Worthington’s “Auto Splash”:an ideal splash 
whose perfection may never be realized.83 
80　“Joseph Plateau (1801 - 1883).” Museum Voor De Geschiedenis Van De Wetenschappen
81　“Joseph Antoine Ferdinand Plateau.” Joseph Plateau (1801-1883), MacTutor History of 
Mathematics Archive
82　Edgerton, Harold. Milk Drop Coronet. 1957








The blindness representationalism produced points to the times when images fail. Not 
the technical kind of failure that forbids an apparatus from making an image, but rather 
the imaginary kind that deters one from producing certain kinds of images. Represen-
tations metamorphosized into a representational regime, where the world is understood 
as a picture84 and a picture is only meaningful when it aligns with the rigid framework 
of rationality and objectivity. This philosophy is expressed in the aesthetics of early 
documentary photography — sharp and detailed. With this in mind, a historical explo-
ration of  ‘failed images’— blurred images, under and overexposed images and staged 
photography — can reveal the representational crises in different forms. Alternative 
photographic practices, often overlooked in mainstream photographic discourses, chal-
lenge the notion of the camera as the embodiment of an objective recording device. The 
practice of spirit photography in the 1860s exemplifies a constitutive feature of photog-
raphy in general. The blurred imprint in the photograph, created by double exposure 
or the layering of negatives to produce the illusion of a ghost, is not just another niche 
photographic practice. Its spectral qualities call into question the visual expectation of a 
photograph, for what caught on camera is not the image itself but our gazes, our inten-
tions going into the production and reading of the image.
“Vision recognises a presence, but this presence wavers between the transparency of imma-
teriality and materiality. For people interested in ghosts, this wavering indicates a meta-
physical certainty: the existence of ghosts. For people interested in photographic images, this 
wavering indicates a visual and phenomenological uncertainty. We do not know what the 
status is of what we see. It embodies in ontological wavering.” 85 
This photographic uncertainty is not a mere rhetorical figure of speech. 
Research led by Helmholtz, Plateau and others in physiological optics has proven that 
human vision is highly inconsistent and easily fooled by optical illusions. Our percep-
tion is dependent on personal experience, memory and other environmental factors. 
The external object that is sensed and created a stimulus in the nervous system does 
not always translate into the perception of that very same object. The simple fact that 
our eyes can see our noses all the time yet our brains rendered it invisible in our field of 
vision86 would make anyone reevaluate Cartesian optics. The wave properties of light 
also pose challenges on the ‘objective’ camera as diffraction limits the ability of a lens to 
84　Heidegger M. The Age of the World Picture. In: Tauber A.I. (eds) Science and the Quest for Reality. Main Trends of the Modern 
World. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1977
85　Alphen, Ernst van. Failed Images: Photography and Its Counter-Practices. Valiz, 2018. p.136
86　Mach, Ernst. Self-Portrait by Ernst Mach. 1886.
resolve an image. The greater the diffractions, the less determi-
nate the boundaries of an image are. That is to say, in addition 
to lens distortions, the resolution is compromised because of the 
very fact that photography draws with light.
Olafur Eliasson’s piece Big Bang Fountain, made in 2014 
and exhibited at his 2019 retrospective at Tate Modern, directs 
the viewer’s thought to the very question of perception. Inside 
a dark, square room, a fountain is set up in the centre. Water—
dyed blue and illuminated by a strobe light—is pumped up before 
the viewer in quick bursts. The strobe light catches the bust at 
the apex of the trajectory, freezing the globular form before it is 
pulled down by gravity.87 Rather than letting the viewer expe-
rience the entire motion of the water, only a chosen moment 
is revealed. The installation alludes to Edgerton’s high-speed 
photography, in which motion is frozen using the high-frequency 
pulse of the flash. In Eliasson’s, however, the stroboscopic seeing 
is slowed down to a human temporality, as it is designed for 
the human eye rather than the fast shutter of the camera. Some 
might be mesmerized by the spectacular visual form of water 
splash; others might see the photographic connection, but more 
fundamentally, the work reflects the condition of human percep-
tion. Humans do in fact perceive our physical environment in 
glimpses. Yet despite the blinking, the saccades and all the other 
small movements our eyes make, our field of vision remains rela-
tively stable. Our perception of reality is an image our brain has 
construed by interweaving and reprocessing discrete sensual 
data. Big Bang Fountain’s strobe light flashes every two seconds, 
Edgerton’s every millionth of a second; human vision operates in 
the timeframe between these two extremes. There are many layers 
to Big Bang Fountain but at the very least, the installation guides 
viewers to the realization that “the eye is not a camera that forms 
and delivers an image, nor is the retina simply a keyboard that 
can be struck by fingers of light.”88
87　Eliasson, Olafur. Big Bang Fountain. 2014, Tate Modern, London. Photo: Anders Sune Berg




At the same exhibition, a blue memo asks “Is your blue 
the same as mine?”,89 a typical question about human perception 
that has been a main interest of physiological optics. This very 
question has fuelled a decades-long enquiry to reorganize the 
relationships between knowledge, reality and human perception. 
That enquiry is phenomenology. A philosophical phenomenon is 
seldom the work of a few geniuses, nor is it confined to a certain 
period. The mainstream narrative identifies Western philosophers 
Hegel, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger as main proponents 
of the ideology. In his book Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel critiqued 
“Absolute Knowledge”;90 the idea that knowledge is an instru-
ment and a medium that presupposes distinction of ourselves 
from the knowledge itself. The classical notion of knowledge 
takes for granted that the absolute truth stand on one side and 
humankind stands on the other, independent from the absolute. 
Hegel proposes an alternative notion of knowledge by bringing 
human consciousness into the discourse. He suggested that there 
is no way to ‘know’ without the mind somehow interacting with 
the world under investigation. The subject and object are tied up 
and knowledge is not completely separate from ourselves. The 
fact that we cannot know without our consciousness and percep-
tion brings uncertainty to knowledge.
The Hegelian argument that pure knowledge does not 
exist is further elaborated by Husserl whose work reflects on 
everyday experience to uncover its underlying structure. His 
thesis is a reflective study of how things appear to our conscious 
awareness, and how the world appears to us. He, continuing 
Hegel's argument on knowledge, critiqued the idea of natural 
attitude;91 the belief that the world is ‘out there’ and separable 
from our experience. Merleau-Ponty, who shares an intellectual 
proximity with Husserl, summarizes phenomenology in his book 
Phenomenology of Perception as “ a manner or style of thinking, that 
existed as a movement before arriving at complete awareness 
89　Eliasson, Olafur. Expanded Studio, 2019. Tate Modern, London. Photo: Sheung Yiu
90　Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Phenomenology of Spirit. Clarendon Press, 1977.
91　Merleau-Ponty, M., and Colin Smith. Phenomenology of Perception: (5. Impr.). Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. New York: The Humanities Press, 1970
of itself as a philosophy.”92 Merleau-Ponty further explained this style of thinking by 
borrowing Husserl’s call to the “things themselves”,93  to return humankind to a world 
which precedes knowledge from the world “of which knowledge always speaks, and in 
relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-lan-
guage, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand 
what a forest, a prairie or a river is.”94
Husserl’s phenomenology heralded a drastic shift from the way representation-
alism situates humankind in relation to knowledge and reality. Under phenomenology, 
the subject-object dichotomy dissolves. New findings in perception reveal the absurdity 
of the notion of an independent observer. Human vision is a product of its environment. 
This scepticism of absolute knowledge extends to the ‘objectivity’ of the camera, leading 
to a rethinking of the ‘truth claim’ of photography. While bringing uncertainties to 
knowledge, phenomenology brings the same uncertainty to the previously naturalized 
connection between photography and reality. 
In order to return to the things themselves, Husserl prescribed a regimen he 
called phenomenological reduction. It entails a paradigmatic change in the manner we 
engage with the world, with ‘things’. The regimen attempts to undo our habits of ‘under-
standing’ the world through theories and concepts—as we have been conditioned to do 
since the scientific revolution and through the Enlightenment without our acknowledge-
ment. Instead, Husserl advocated ‘epoché’, or the suspension of judgement. By letting go 
of these intellectual constructions, we can begin experiencing the world, engaging with 
‘things’ through our perception. Underpinning this mode of thinking is the acknowl-
edgement that the objectivity of science is compromised by the very framework of 
science itself and the psychological assumptions of the scientist. To borrow Husserl’s 
framework on our discourse of images, “to the things themselves”95 means throwing the 
picture away and reaching our hands for the objects. It also means that we should expe-
rience an image as an object. It is not a mere representation of a ‘world out there’.
Applying phenomenology to our context, photographic reduction96 switches 
the focus from the photographic image to photographic activities (i.e. the interaction 
between the photographer, the act of photographing, the camera and the production 
of the photograph) in an attempt to reconstruct a new understanding of a photograph. 





96　Cheung, Chan-Fai, et al. Kairos: Phenomenology and Photography. Zeta Books, 2012.
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into a photographic frame. For a photographer to produce a photograph, they must see 
through the viewfinder of the camera and perceive the world as a surface. Seeing the 
world as a picture is “in essence a restricted seeing and not seeing in a natural attitude.”97 
The representational apparatus fortifies the connection between the image and reality by 
the rationalization of sight through the geometrification of optics.98 When the certainty 
of classical optics was challenged by physiological optics, the indexicality of photography 
provided a new argument to justify the relationship. Phenomenology acknowledges that 
the status quo of a photograph as the representation of reality is a social construct. The 
phenomenological apparatus asks: What separates a photograph from reality despite its 
indexicality and its mechanical reproduction?
Canadian artist Jeff Wall was at the forefront of rethinking the pictorialist 
tradition and photography theory in late twentieth century. Although he refused the 
rudimentary reading of the photographic surface as a direct representation of reality, 
he admitted that photography also cannot escape the mechanics of representations. A 
photograph cannot respond to the phenomenological enquiry in the same way modernist 
art does because photography cannot find an alternative to depiction.
“Photography constitutes a depiction not by the accumulation of individual marks, but 
by the instantaneous operation of an integrated mechanism. All the rays permitted to pass 
through the lens form an image immediately, and the lens, by definition, creates a focused 
image at its correct focal length. Depiction is the only possible result of the camera system, 
and the kind of image formed by a lens is the only image possible in photography. Thus, no 
matter how impressed photographers may have been by the analytical rigour of modernist 
critical discourse, they could not participate in it directly in their practice because the speci-
ficities of their medium did not permit it." 99 
What photography can do instead is to put into play “its own necessary condi-
tion of being depiction-which-constitutes-an-object.”100 Photography approaches the 
kind of reflexivity made mandatory for modernist art by critically examining represen-
tationalism. This involves stretching representation to its limit to unveil what is compro-
mised in the act of translating the world onto a surface and to question the implication 
of reality itself. For Jeff Wall, he chose to rework the tradition of reportage practised 
by documentary photographers like Robert Frank or Garry Winogrand. Meticulously 
97　Ibid. p.21
98　Referring to Classical optics, which is hugely based on Euclidean geometry and Cartesian optics
99　Wall, Jeff. Jeff Wall: Selected Essays and Interviews. The Museum of Modern Art, 2007. p.40
100　Ibid.
restaging ‘decisive moments’ using non-professional actors 
in real settings, he reinvigorates the concept of the tableau in 
photography, which had a long hiatus as modernists fixated on 
photograph’s unique ability to record the world in the early twen-
tieth-century.101 His work Mimic102 depicts a staged scene of racial 
abuse that he witnessed on a Vancouver street in which a white 
man made a ‘slant-eye’ gesture towards an Asian pedestrian.
To be clear, staged photography is nothing new to 
photography. In fact, as long as there has been photography, 
there has been staged photography.103 Soon after announcing his 
invention of the calotype, Fox Talbot had the idea of making some 
“delightful pictures” by asking servants to dress up and stand in 
for him.104 Wall, in contrast, recreated his scene with an entirely 
different intention to Fox Talbot’s. He is not presenting a fiction 
to his viewers, rather his tableau is a staged reality. One cannot 
make a simple conclusion as to whether the photograph depicts 
reality or not based on the reasoning of the representational 
apparatus. The photograph depicts the real world not because of 
the ‘traces’ left on the light-sensitive surface. As a matter of fact, 
the “that-has-been”105 registered on the photographic surface is 
not the exact moment that the racial abuse occurred. However, 
racial abuse is, in fact, part of our reality and has manifested in 
an incident which Wall himself witnessed. The realism of Wall’s 
photograph does not stem from its signs because there is no ‘real’ 
referent. Its realism stems from a fiction that is real. What Wall 
attempted to do, as Cindy Sherman also explored in her Unti-
tled Film Stills,106 is to renounce the residual trust we have in the 
mechanical eye and put the last blow in representationalism. It is 
an answer to the artistic problem.
101　Weiss, Marta Rachel. Making It up: Photographic Fictions. Thames & Hudson, 2018. Introduction
102　Wall, Jeff. Mimic, 1982
103　Weiss, Making It up: Photographic Fictions. 2018. 
104　Henry Fox Talbot, Willian. and  Jones, Calvert Richard, The Fruit Sellers, 1845
105　Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. The Noonday Press, 1988. Also 
called the photograph’s noema.





“The public believed that the photograph could not lie, and it was 
easier for the photographer if he believed it too, or pretended to. 
Thus he was likely to claim that what our eyes saw was an illusion 
and what the camera saw was the truth,” 107 
Thomas Demand’s photographs work with a similar 
logic. The German sculptor creates large-scale photographs of 
life-size paper models depicting architectural spaces in which 
historical events took place. In his work such as Tunnel 108 and 
Presidency II,109 the “that has been” is nothing but paper card-
board. The true oeuvre of Demand does not lie on the photo-
graphic surface as much as in his meticulous construction of the 
spaces. To create a convincingly real photograph, Demand had to 
painstakingly arrange every piece of paper for the camera. This 
involves closely following Cartesian perspectivalism. In building 
the scene, he ironically conformed to a rational, optical model 
of photographic representation, placing the sculpted shapes in 
the correct positions in order to fit the three-dimensional space 
seamlessly onto a flat surface. Demand was forced to create 
duplicates of a number of his sculptures when he first started 
because “he found that the camera lens introduced distortions 
that altered the formal relationship he wanted to see in his sculp-
ture.”110 Roleplaying as “a perspectivalist painter using a camera 
obscura to reproduce the observed world,”111 a practice closely 
associated with Cartesian optics, Demand reflected back on the 
picture of modernist representation. In the process, he scruti-
nized the truth claim of photography grounded in indexicality 
and representationalism. He and Wall are two of many prominent 
voices within critical representationalism.
The tension between the staged and the real continued 
to be a major motif of contemporary photography and beyond. 
107　Szarkowski, John. The Photographer's Eye. The Museum of Modern Art, 2012. p.8
108　Demand, Thomas. Tunnel. 1999.
109　Demand, Thomas. Presidency II. 2008.
110　Nieberding, William J. “Photography, Phenomenology and Sight: toward an Understanding of 
Photography through the Discourse of Vision.” The Ohio State University, 2011.
111　Jay, Martin. Downcast Eyes: the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought. Univ. 
of California Press, 2009. p.70
The Iranian film Close Up directed by Abbas Kiarostami bril-
liantly explored the blurred boundary between documentary and 
fiction. The film tells the story of the real-life trial of a man who 
impersonated filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf, conning a family 
into believing they would star in his new film. Kiarostami hired 
the people involved to star in his film, this time a real one, to 
reenact the whole event. The whole cast played as themselves in 
a sequence of fictional events, which in turn is based on what has 
happened—a real fiction. Like Demand’s work, the captivating 
part of the work lies in the production of the image. Kiarostami 
shot the movie in forty days without any scripts. The actors went 
on set with their own ‘scripts’ based on how they remember the 
events. In some shots, one of the characters did not know that he 
was in front of a camera whereas the other one did. Kiarostami 
described Close Up years later as “a film that made itself”.112 More 
than showing the futility of distinguishing facts from fiction, the 
director turns the mechanism of representation inside out.
Even war photographers became self-aware of the repre-
sentational apparatus, reexamining their practices with a critical 
eye. Photographers are more willing to point out the fictionality 
in the superficial realism of their photographs. Staged photog-
raphy, which had once been considered a taboo, has been adopted 
by many documentary photographers. In general, photographers 
who work with reality as their material are less certain about the 
problematic word ‘documentary’ and tend to describe their work 
as visual narratives. Or they might simply not find the label rele-
vant to their work anymore. The work of French photographer 
Emeric Lhuisset certainly does not fit into simple categories. In 
Theatre of War,113  lhuisset worked with Kurdish guerrilla groups 
that were at war on the Iraq/Iran border. Frustrated by the 
inability to capture stories he collected from witnesses through 
interviews, he asked them to reenact the events in front of the 
camera. Once again, we can see the photographer’s scepticism 
112　 “Abbas Kiarostami.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 28 Apr. 2005





of truth claim. We can look at the project Libyan Sugar114 by war
 photographer Michael Christopher Brown who lost two of his 
colleagues, Tim Hetherington and Chris Hondros, in a military 
attack during their job documenting the Libyan Revolution. 
Rather than offering a documentary account of the war, the 
photographer characterised his project as a road trip through a 
war zone. Layered with diaristic photographs, journal entries, and 
correspondence with family and colleagues, Brown told a story 
about the intertwined relationship between the photographer 
and the war, the observer and the events that transpired in front 
of him. It is hard not to doubt how anyone could claim to be an 
unaffected ‘observer’ of war, seeing how traumatizing the expe-
rience of war is, even to a Magnum photographer—to someone 
who has the privilege to choose to leave the war zone when they 
want. Or we can look back at Emeric lhuisset’s Chebab115 in which 
the photographer has decided to give up his auteurship once and 
for all and strapped a body camera to a soldier. The final work is 
a 24-hour loop of the war as experienced by forefront fighter in 
real life, without editing, without the excitement and the blood, 
without the exaggerated drama of a composed image; simply war 
as it is.
All these attempts by photographers exemplify an aware-
ness of the representational apparatus. The notion of an indepen-
dent observer and mechanical objectivity is an imagined one. The 
subject-object dichotomy is being questioned and replaced by 
intersubjectivity. The rationalization of sight and the independent 
human subject began to separate from representation through 
the regimen of phenomenological reduction. Representation itself 
is scrutinized in new lights, leading to a reformulation of the 
logic behind Tom Gunning’s truth claim. “Now, representation is 
re-presentation: the subject's deferral of what presences in order 
to present it again, but this time on the subject's terms, according 
114　Brown, Michael Christopher. At a morgue, he was killed during fighting in Benghazi. Banghazi, 
Libya. March 20, 2011. Courtesy of the artist
Brown, Michael Christopher. Photographer Michael Christopher Brown at Hikma hospital after 
being hit by the mortar. Misrata, Libya. April 20, 2011. Courtesy of the artist
115　Lhuisset, Emeric. Chebab, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.
to the subject's sovereign will.”116 The interest in the photographic surface has shifted 
to photographers and their photographic process. Phenomenology gave photography 
a new insight into its own para-images. The criticality towards representationalism is 
embodied in different experimentations of the medium. One obvious approach involves 
exploring the surrealistic potential of photography, in a similar way that “Surrealists 
had discarded art’s claim to provide representative ‘resemblances’ of the external world 
in favour of repetitive ‘similitudes’ that circulate a series of visual and linguistic signs 
without any external referents.”117 
116　Kleinberg-Levin, D. M. Sites of vision: The discursive construction of sight in the
history of philosophy. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 1999. p.403







Phenomenological Apparatus: Image as Experience
48 49
The National Science and Media Museum in Bradford, England held exhibition in its 
Wonderlab called Can you capture a splash? The exhibition panel introduces Harold Edger-
ton's milk coronet and his endeavour in refining his time-freezing high-speed photog-
raphy. The wall-text reads: “This high-speed camera takes photos 40 times faster than 
the blink of an eye. It’s able to capture detail you can’t see.” On the side is an installation 
consists of a simple photo studio setup with a clear acrylic box, a control panel and a 
huge monitor. 
Exhibits in science museums tend to follow a certain design principle. A 
panel explains the scientific theories behind the exhibition in brief terms. The exhibi-
tion usually has an obvious point of interaction, whether it is a huge button, a handle 
or levers, so even though the visitors may have no patience reading, they can still play. 
A science museum exhibition is first a toy before anything else and the one in front of 
me is no exception. Two young teens got in before me and instinctively began turning 
the knob on the panel. As a boy pressed the button, the acrylic box let out a flash and 
without them realizing it, a photo appeared on the monitor. A coloured photo of a 
ripple. It seems that he had missed the water splash at the apex of its motion. Without 
missing a beat, the pair turned the knob, adjusting the delay of the flash in milliseconds 
and pressed the second time.
Another flash. Another photo. A lot was happening in between. The teens 
hardly paid attention, but any photographer who has tried to capture a water splash 
would know. After the button was pressed, the machine let out a controlled drop of 
water, the water fell until it reached the black cup filled to the brim with water. It trig-
gered the shutter and a twinkling of an eye later, a flash is produced. If the delayed time 
is set right, the camera will capture a beautiful water splash frozen at its peak. Unfortu-
nately, the delay of the flash this time was too early—‘nothing’ was captured. The photo-
graph did capture the water ripple on the cup, but other than that nothing of human 
interest. The teens compared the result with Edgerton’s infamous photo of milk coronet 
on the side, noticeably dissatisfied and continued their quest to freeze a water drop.
The Speedlite in the box kept flashing. The teens carefully adjusted the delay 
time. They kept on going, trying to get that sharp, in-focus perfect shot. But the details 
that they were promised never came. After what must have been the thirtieth shot, the 
young photographers were visibly frustrated. They quickly decided to move on, disin-
terested in both the photo setup and the phenomenon itself. After all, there were more 
toys to fiddle with in the lab. And to be fair, they could not see the water drop with their 
naked eyes anyway. At least not with the blinding flash.
It is not particularly radical anymore in today’s digital culture to say that the 
image is an experience in itself, maybe even more important than the first-hand expe-
rience with the real thing. Professor Hiroaki Ota, a Japanese psychiatrist working in 
France, was the first to diagnose a peculiar psychological condition among Japanese 
tourists— Paris Syndrome (パリ症候群).118 The syndrome is a result of an extreme 
shock realising that Paris is very different from their expectations. The city of light looks 
duller than it is in the movies. The Eiffel Tower does not look as photogenic as it is in the 
postcards. In serious cases, the disappointment can turn into anxiety, acute delusions 
and hallucinations. It is still unknown why Japanese tourists are especially susceptible to 
Paris Syndrome. First diagnosed in 1986, the syndrome would not surprise photo theo-
rists like Susan Sontag, who had already warned us about the effect of photography on 
the real in On Photography, published in 1977:
“Knowing a great deal about what is in the world (art, catastrophe, the beauties of nature) 
through photographic images, people are frequently disappointed, surprised, unmoved when 
they see the real thing. For photographic images tend to subtract feeling from something we 
experience at first hand and the feelings they do arouse are, largely, not those we have in real 
life. Often something disturbs us more in photographed form than it does when we actually 
experience it.” 119
That same sentiment was felt by tourists heading to Lapland, Finland in the 
winter of 2018. They were expecting to arrive at a winter wonderland only to be disap-
pointed by the region’s lack of snow.120 Knowing that the historic low-level of snow 
cover could never match the tourists’ expectations, tour companies cancelled the trips to 
Lapland. “The pictures I have seen look terrible,” one tourist said. Another complained: 
“We paid for a once in a lifetime trip to magical Lapland with our daughter, based on a 
TUI brochure of snowmobiles and husky rides.”
Reality is often disappointing, especially when we are constantly comparing it 
to a photograph. You may have travelled to Lapland, but unless your trip matches with 
what is depicted on an image, that experience of travelling will be inauthentic. Never 
have we ever carried so many expectations of cities we have never visited and cared so 
much about an authentic experience. In I Know I Will See What I Have Seen Before (2015),121 
Thomas Albdorf asked: can one know a place without ever having set foot there? To 
answer these questions, he gave himself a mission to create photographs of the popular 
118　Wyatt, Caroline. “Europe | 'Paris Syndrome' Strikes Japanese.” BBC News, BBC, 20 Dec. 2006
119　Sontag, Susan. On Photography. Penguin Classics, 2011
120　Bateman, Tom. “Tourists Turned off by Finland's Unusual ‘Black’ Lapland Cancel Holiday Jaunts.” Yle Uutiset, 22 Nov. 2018
121　Albdorf, Thomas. Focus test, 2015. Courtesy of the artist.
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tourist destination—the Alps— from behind his computer 
screen. Using an extensive selection of sourced image from tourist 
brochures and Heimatfilms, he recreated the cliché majestic 
mountain landscapes in his studio and in Photoshop. He then 
tested his creations with image recognition software and discov-
ered tricks to hack the software. For example, the software recog-
nises an image as a waterfall when the human eye clearly sees a 
handful of dust being thrown onto a dark cloth. Albdorf reveals 
the way images construct spaces. A repetition of images creates 
an idea of a place, which promotes the production of a certain 
image of the place, which in turn consolidates the experience of it. 
The cycle repeats itself until we can only see what we have already 
witnessed a thousand times over and created a reality of that 
place. Moreover, a photograph is a projection—like lighthouses. 
They should not be understood as “representations of things 
out in the world but as signposts directed outward.”122 A photo-
graph is first and foremost a fiction about reality that often gets 
confused with reality. Similar to how image recognition software 
misidentifies a handful of dust as waterfalls, human misdecode 
the photogenic mountain landscape as the Austrian Alps.
The main takeaway here is not that photography is 
fraudulent and photographers are malicious scammers out to 
trick unsuspecting tourists. It is not useful to hold onto the 
Platonic binary framework of the ‘real’ and the ‘copy’ and put 
judgement on an image according to its similitude to reality. The 
discourse on images should move beyond:
“Photoshop is everywhere. It’s on your phone and it’s in your 
computer, and everybody has the experience of photoshopping 
somebody into a group picture, so that the photographer can be 
in the image. We know! and yet we still have the idea, this ideal, 
this nearly indestructible belief in the mimetic photograph. We’re 
only slowly arriving at the moment when the manipulated image 
is part of our perception. Not just in worried newsrooms and 
122　Flusser Vilém, et al. Into the Universe of Technical Images. University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 
p.48
121 anxious scientific-journal headquarters–not (to not just) in the 
sense of a dreaded onslaught of fraud.” 123 
As experience is increasingly mediated and abstracted, 
“‘Authentic’ experience becomes both elusive and allusive as it is 
placed beyond the horizon of present lived experience, the beyond 
in which the antique, the pastoral, the exotic, the other fictive 
domains are articulated.”124 Our experience is not replaced by the 
myth cultivated by photography; it is supported by it. American 
photographer Drew Nikonowicz explores the notion of authentic 
experience in This World and Others Like It (2017).125 Experimenting 
with different forms of media and their representations, from 
the nineteenth-century geological surveys of pioneers such as 
Timothy H. O'Sullivan126 to analog large-format photographs to 
re-photographed digital images,127 the series is a photographic 
investigation on the mechanics of seeing. Nikonowicz does not 
distinguish between ‘straight’ photography from computer 
generated photographs or documentary photography from 
internet archives. In his project, the photographer uses mapping 
software to create landscapes and ‘rephotographed’ them from 
within the software. There is no real representation of the 
external world: all are equally valid embodiments of an experi-
enced reality. To him, the world we experience via our screen is 
as real as the physical reality that surrounds us.128  Rather than a 
representation of the world, images embody an experience of the 
world, and one cannot neatly categorize experience into real and 
fake, lived and mediated; one can only speak of the authenticity 
of the experience.
123　Monteith, Matthew. “The Lives of Images: Peter Galison in Conversation with Trevor Paglen.”, 
Issue 211: Curiosity, Aperture Magazine, 15 May 2013, pp. 33–39
124　Stewart, Susan. On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the 
Collection. Duke University Press, 2007.
125　Nikonowicz , Drew. 2014-11-05 11:31:54 AM 38°56'53.53" N 092°19'34.22" W 00749, from the 
project This World and Others Like It. 2017. Courtesy of the artist.
Nikonowicz , Drew. 2012-05-01 04:59:27 PM 38°59'08.83" N 092°22'47.89" W 00741, from the 
project This World and Others Like It. 2017. Courtesy of the artist.
126　O'Sullivan, Timothy H., Cañon de Chelle. Walls of the Grand Cañon about 1200 Feet in Height, 
1873.
127　Nikonowicz , Drew. 2016-09-27 01:04:00 PM 45°44'24.92" N 012°16'02.23" E 00120, from the 
project This World and Others Like It. 2017. Courtesy of the artist.






When told “you have something on your face”, the 
common thing to do today is to take out your smartphone, turn 
on the front-facing camera and consult the screen. Images become 
mirrors and selfies become our faces. After the popularization 
of smartphones and social media, the word selfie very quickly 
entered the English lexicon. The Oxford Dictionary defines selfie 
as “a photograph that one has taken of oneself...and shared via 
social media,”134 putting an extra emphasis on the dissemination 
of images. The selfie effect,135 a term coined by the plastic surgeon 
and researcher Boris Paskhover, describes the distortive effects 
of short distance photographs on nasal appearance. His research 
shows that a photo taken at an arm’s length makes the base of the 
nose appear approximately 30% wider compared to a photograph 
taken at 5 feet, a standard portrait distance.136 Consequently, 
this distortion is catching many selfie-takers off guard and even 
driving some to consult plastic surgeons to make their noses ‘look’ 
smaller. According to a 2017 poll by the American Academy 
of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons,137 55% of facial 
plastic surgeons reported seeing patients who wanted surgery to 
help them look better in selfies.
The repeated consensus among photographers is that 
a portrait should be shot with a telephoto lens at some distance 
from the subject. A wide lens exaggerates spatial distance, making 
the foreground appear much bigger and closer to the lens. Often 
neglected, distortions are inherent to any image taken by an 
apparatus. In order to make the world looks right to the camera, 
photographers employ different techniques to match the final 
image to what is being observed. That is part of their profession-
alism. But as images merge with the perception of self, the repre-
sentation merges with its referent. We change our nose to look 
better in a selfie. We stage our lives for photographs. How we 
134　“Selfie”. Oxford dictionary Third Edition, June 2014
135　Ward, Brittany, et al. “Nasal Distortion in Short-Distance Photographs: The Selfie Effect.” JAMA 
Facial Plastic Surgery, vol. 20, no. 4, Jan. 2018, p. 333., doi:10.1001/jamafacial.2018.0009.
136　Example of Nasal Size Distortion in a Short-Distance Photograph and Derived Model, Courtesy 
of researchers
137　“The American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (AAFPRS).” The Grants 
Register 2018, 2018, pp. 29–29.
look in an image feels more important than how we are in the ‘real world’. The imitation 
creates its own reality. 
“It is even possible that by looking carefully at the selfie we can discern the future shape of 
our own species not as individuals connected to each other via social fabric, governed by 
self-interest and competition, but as nodal points formed from the cross-fertilization between 
human and artificial intelligence.” 138 
This process repeats and continues until the distinction between the two is 
irrelevant. The man who dreamt about a butterfly does not know if he has dreamt the 
butterfly or if the butterfly has dreamt him. In Jean Baudrillard’s frequently-quoted 
work Simulacra and Simulations, he examined the notion of the image by reversing the 
Platonic dichotomy of the real and the copy. By driving the emphasis away from the 
question of imitation, Baudrillard proposed that many contemporary social phenomena 
should be understood by examining how the signs of the real are being substituted for 
the real itself. In the first essay of the book The Precession of Simulacra, he listed four 
progressively abstract philosophical orientations towards images, beginning with the 
Platonic notion of image as a representation of the world and ended with his concept of 
simulacra. Images, he proclaimed, are simulacra that do not owe us reality. Their realism 
does not guarantee a connection with reality. As a matter of fact, in the postmodern 
world, oftentimes they have no relation to reality whatsoever. The raison d'être of a selfie 
is not to truthfully represent our faces; we take a selfie exactly for everything else but 
that—the Snapchat filters and the beautification. We perceive ourselves through photos. 
We reshape our nose to look better in selfies. Representations are stacked over other 
representations—and underneath all of these layers,  there is no original referent. The 
illusionary trickery of images is no longer possible because “the real is no longer possi-
ble.”139 Seen against the backdrop of Baudrillardian simulacra, the Huawei moon photo 
scandal140 is anything but surprising.
For a long time in Chinese, the words ‘elephant’, ‘similitude’, ‘phenomena’ and 
‘image’ have shared the same character. The Chinese etymology dictionary Kangxi 
Dictionary141 explains: real-life encounter of elephant is rare in ancient China. People 
more often saw its drawing than a real elephant. The drawing becomes the only way for 
138　Rubinstein, Daniel. “Keeping Up With the Cartesians: on the Culture of the Selfie With Continual Reference to Kim Kardashian”. In: 
Public, Private, Secret: On photography and the configuration of self. Edited by Charlotte Cotton. 2018
139　Baudrillard, Jean, and Sheila Faria. Glaser. Simulacra and Simulation. University of Michigan Press, 2018. p.19





people to grasp the idea of the elusive animal. The representation of the elephant per se 
becomes the perception of one. That is the earliest acknowledgement I know of of an 
image as a phenomenological phenomenon, a phenomenon that is as real as, if not realer 
than, the real.142 





Phenomenological Apparatus: Image as Event
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We live in a world where images play multiple complex roles. More than 
depictions of our experience, images shape our experience. The traditional understanding 
of an image as a window to the world, while still valid, is no longer useful to address 
the complex, intertwined relationship that it has with our world. The philosophy of 
perception establishes a new way of seeing. Images are not mere representations; they 
engender their own realities. The compound effect of simultaneous image-taking and 
image-sharing facilitated by social media, for example, has had a fundamental impact on 
human perception. 
Sociologist Nathan Jurgenson coined the term ‘documentary vision’ to describe 
this perceptual change, a new type of vision where we view our every living moment as 
a potential past to be shared in the future. Documentary vision blurs the line between 
experience and its documentation, between the image and the world. Jurgenson elabo-
rated his observation:
“The line and the causality between the person and their documentation on social media has 
been upended, twisted over, turned inside out, blurred and imploded into a state of mutual 
coexistence without clear division or causal precedence. We need to begin our analysis of 
social media documentation with the assumption that experience and documentation are 
not separate, but mutually co-determining. The causality goes both ways: Life has now become 
as subservient to the document as the document is subservient to life.” 143 
The conceptual fallacy of viewing online and offline as two separate spheres is 
falling apart. So is the dichotomy of the image and the world. Contemporary objects live 
through a cycle. It is experienced, translated into an image, experienced yet again online 
and reincarnated back into an object in the physical world. 
Contemporary architecture lives in this cycle. Thomas Heatherwick’s Vessel, 
currently under construction in New York, was designed under the instructions of his 
client to be a spectacle.144 The elaborate $200million staircase to nowhere, when finished, 
would be a 46 metre-high goblet as tall as it is high, nicely fitting into the square frame 
of Instagram. Increasing number of clients come in to architecture firm asking for 
picture-perfect buildings, driving the industry towards a populist approach to design. 
The industry, in turn, internalized Instagram aesthetics. Australian architect Scott Valen-
tine wrote an Instagram design guide,145 detailing ways to build “a visual sense of amaze-
143　Jurgenson, Nathan. “Experiencing Life Through the Logic of Facebook.” Cyborgology, 27 Oct. 2011
144　Wainwright, Oliver. “Snapping Point: How the World's Leading Architects Fell under the Instagram Spell.” The Guardian, Guardian 
News and Media, 23 Nov. 2018
145　Valentine, Scott. “Designing Instagrammable: Understanding the Psychology of Instagram.” Valé, Valé, 9 Jan. 2018
ment”. In the guide, the architect suggests different ways a restaurant can design space 
that is more photographable and inviting for guests “to take the main stage”. 
While throughout history, there have been buildings or architectural elements, 
such as Michealangelo’s mural in the Sistine Chapel, that are designed to fit a single 
perspective, never have representations held so much power over architectural reality. 
Man-made structures before technical images, the Great Wall, The Pantheon, the Aztec 
pyramids, despite being spectacular to look at, seem to primarily serve a utilitarian 
purpose, whether it be military or religious. Now representations themselves has become 
the end goal of a building. The snake bites its tail.
Near the end of the guide, Valentine reminds designers to consider the “six 
universal truths of influence”, highlighting the connection between social psychology of 
Instagram and design. An architecture becomes a potential ‘photogenic experience’. It 
doesn’t matter if artists take them into account during the design process; the architec-
ture will be perceived as one. Emperor Huizong of the Chinese Song Dynasty, who, driven 
by his passion for the arts built the Imperial Painting House, would have been dumb-
founded if he were to experience Instagrammable architecture. The Imperial Painting 
House he built had nurtured a generation of talented Chinese artists who went out to 
make some of the most famous pieces of ink paintings, but he probably would not have 
imagined erecting a building simply for the sake of representation itself—the Debordian 
spectacle, a “capital to such a degree of accumulation that it becomes an image”.146
Images become an integral part of spectacles. Guy Debord famously said: “The 
spectacle is not a collection of images, but a social relation among people, mediated by 
images.”147 The founding member of the Situationist International has already observed 
in the last century that everything that was directly lived has been ingested into a repre-
sentation. This accumulation was composed of the discrete images detached from life, 
separated from their original context, and reunited as an autonomous world apart from 
lived experience.148 The causality between images and events is reversed. The images 
rule the workers, and the world is constructed for the images. The boom of pop-up 
museums, exhibition spaces built to provide visitors with giddily colourful backdrops 
for foolproof photogenic Instagram photos,149 proves once again this inverse relationship 
between the world and its representation. The Museum of Ice Cream, a museum equiva-
lent of carnival cutout photo boards, is indeed so successful that it has forced major art 
146　Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Black and Red, 1977. p.427
147　Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Black and Red, 1977
148　Jay, Martin. Downcast Eyes: the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought. Univ. of California Press, 1993. p.427
149　Pardes, Arielle. “The Rise of the Made-for-Instagram Museum.” Wired, Conde Nast, 27 Sept. 2017
Haigney, Sophie. “The Museums of Instagram.” The New Yorker, The New Yorker, 16 Sept. 2018
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institutions to reconsider their approach to social media.150 Director of Digital at the 
Jewish Museum of New York Jia Jia Fei acknowledged their impact in a TED Talk on 
Art in the Age of Instagram, saying: “The world has seen an increase in these ‘spectacle’ 
exhibitions that have really taken on a new dimension online.” Artworks that are not 
designed for Instagram, such as Yayoi Kusama’s Infinity Mirrored Room and the Rain 
Room at MoMA, have taken on a life of its own online. 
The reversed causality is made more apparent by the advent of smartphones 
and social media. The notion of audience and social engagement is magnified. The 
Shakespearean proverb “all the world’s a stage”151 takes on a contemporary twist in the 
age of social media. The site of image production and the site of image dissemination 
merges. While in the past, paintings tended to be made in the studio or in a patron's 
house and films in movie sets, in a smartphone-driven digital culture, photographs are 
taken whenever and wherever one likes. The fictions that had been confined to the studio 
have overflowed into the real world. The movie set expands infinitely. Prank videos, 
Vlogs, Youtube challenges152 and extreme selfies,153 we “do it for the views.” We perform 
for the cameras, creating spectacle after spectacle to fight for attention in the 24/7, 
all-encompassing online reality TV show. In the process, the causality of event and its 
representation becomes cyclical as the online and offline world fuses into one.
Images become events. In his project Dawn Breaking – A Museum Film Project 
(2018) at Shanghai’s Long Museum West Bund, Chinese video artist Yang Fudong 
literally turned museums into stages. He moved his film production into museums and 
other exhibition spaces. He led a crew of actors and production team to shoot a histor-
ical period film about the Song dynasty in two large scale sets constructed within the 
museum, in front of an audience, over the course of a month. At the end of each day, 
Yang edited a video documentation of the day’s filming. Interspersed with quotations by 
Nietsche and mistakes that happened during the shooting, these dailies serve as a video 
diary detailing the director’s psychological commentary on his process. The weeks-
long filming process materializes in dozens of dailies and towards a final, edited film.154 
The dailies are shown in various combinations, assembled into a continuous film and 
individually on different flat screens, alongside the live movie set, creating an immersive 
video installation.
150　Davis, Ben. “State of the Culture, Part I: Museums, 'Experiences,' and the Year of Big Fun Art.” Artnet News, 2 Jan. 2018
151　Shakespeare, William. As You Like it. Act II, Scene VII [All the world's a stage].
152　Caitlin, Dewey. “A Comprehensive Guide to YouTube’s Dumbest and Most Dangerous Teen Trends.” The Washington Post, 30 July 
2014
153　“Selfie Deaths: 259 People Reported Dead Seeking the Perfect Picture.” BBC, 4 Oct. 2018
154　Fudong, Yang. Video still, Dawn Breaking – A Museum Film Project, 2018
Intending to avoid attributing any fixed meaning to his 
work, Yang did not explicitly reference any specific ideas in the 
press release nor the exhibition handouts, though the phenom-
enological underpinning of the film is undeniable. By revealing 
the structure of film production, the performance within the 
museum created a “simultaneity of art-making and art-viewing.” 
Yang described the project in an interview:155 “The viewer gets 
to be the director: they can see how things change onset, and 
then predict how the film will turn out.” The collapse of the 
distance between film production and screening parallels the 
Instragramification of image production, where the intention of 
representation is flipped inside out. Built to create the illusion 
of time-travelling, movie sets were constructed as a backdrop 
of a representation—the final film, but in Yang’s work, they are 
given a life of their own. They are built for the exhibition audi-
ence as much as they are built to complete the final film. The 
life-size movie sets elaborately setup in the museums become a 
reality themselves, which generate another representations. The 
representation itself becomes the subject of representation. One 
cannot tell which representation among the 36 roughly-edited 
dailies and the polished final film is more ‘meaningful’ in Yang’s 
Museum Film Project. The final film and the dailies homoge-
nize in a holistic artwork, just as multi-million blockbusters and 
amatuer Vlogs and every representation in between becomes 
‘content’ on social media. A representation does not necessitate 
a real referent; it feeds on each other and generates more repre-
sentations in the process. Images become viral, videos comment 
on each other, photographs reference other photographs. Yang 
created a microcosm of image culture in our contemporary 
society—Baudrillard’s hyper-reality—in which the dichotomy 
of the image and the real ceases to be important, and simulation 
begins to precede and engender reality.
The Swiss artist-duo Jojakim Cortis and Adrian 
Sonderegger have been recreating iconic photographs, including 
155　Rappolt, Mark. “Feature: Yang Fudong.” ArtReview, Summer 2019
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Harold Edgerton’s infamous photo Milk Drop Coronet,156 since 
2012. For their project Iconen, the duo build meticulous 
dioramas from scratch, some can take as long as three months 
to recreate and occupy the entirety of their studios.157 After 
photographing every detail of their set, the artists mercilessly 
destroy the painstakingly miniature diorama they worked so 
hard to put up. Nothing is left behind in their studio; only the 
representations remain.
156　Cortis, Jojakim & Sonderegger, Adrian, Making of “Milk Drop Coronet,” (by Harold Edgerton, 
1957), 2016
157　Mufson, Beckett. “These Artists Make Hyper-Realistic Dioramas of History's Most Iconic 









In 1957, Computer pioneer Russell Kirsch and his colleagues 
successfully created the first ever digital image.158 That image is 
of a baby’s face, the face of the scientists’s three-month-old son. 
More precisely speaking, it is of a scanned photograph of his son 
Walden. In the black-and-white digital image, Walden is divided 
into a mosaic of various brightnesses. He is cut up into 30976 
squares, transcoded into values of brightness by a scanner and 
reconstructed into a 176×176 pixel image through a computer 
program. The result is a cute yet eerily disturbing image, one that 
is excavated from the uncanny valley. It triggers an uneasiness in 
viewers who cannot completely grasp what they are looking at. 
They can recognize what is being represented in the image, yet 
it is not a photograph; it is a digitalization of a photograph, a 
representation of a representation. With its invention, a new type 
of technical images emerges—a digital image. A digital image is 
different from a photograph. Its indexicality does not come from 
the ‘that-has-been’ visible to human eyes in the world, it comes 
from the data transcoded by the scanner. The rest of the history 
of the digital image as we know it can be understood as merely 
different manifestations of this single event. Although many of 
us have become accustomed to the digital image as an everyday 
artefact, there are still moments, such as when we encounter a 
DeepDream image159 or an AI-generated fake face on ThisPer-
sonDoesNotExist.com,160 that rekindle the same uneasiness.
The fragmentation of image — the conception of image 
as assemblage of pixels — is a rather recent development that 
can find its roots in computer science. Almost a century ago, 
Ada Lovelace developed the world’s first machine algorithm for 
an early computing machine that only existed on paper.161 She 
suggested programs that would allow an Analytical Engine, an 
invention by Cambridge mathematics professor Charles Babbage, 
to calculate Bernoulli numbers, establishing the idea of mechan-
ical computing. Later in the twentieth century, Alan Turing’s 
158　First digital image created by Russell Kirsch in 1975
159　Mordvintsev, Alex. Cats, 2015. It is one of the first DeepDream images produced.
160　Wang, Philip. Thispersondoesnotexist.com, Dec 2018
161　“Ada Lovelace: The First Computer Programmer.” Mental Floss, 13 Oct. 2015
Turing Machine162 demonstrated that numbers can be encoded on tapes (in binary), 
where mathematical tasks (such as additions) can then be computed physically. His 
model of mechanical computing, which many regarded as an early prototype of modern 
computers, reified the notion of a ‘thinking’ machine. The idea is further expanded in 
the Church-Turing Thesis,163 which hypothesizes that all mathematical functions can 
be effectively computed by a Turing machine. The interpretation of the thesis is highly 
contested, but it engenders a philosophical debate regarding pure computation and 
physical computation: whether all pure computation, from geometry to human cogni-
tive processes, can be embodied within a computer.164 The thesis provides an intellectual 
incentive to break our world down into bits of encodable information for computation. 
More broadly speaking, it establishes the computer as a universal apparatus, an appa-
ratus that sees the world as a field of possibility made up of particles in which to func-
tion.165 It is under this historical background that the first digital image was conceived. 
Each of the 30976 pixels embodies the intention to break down the world into a discret-
ized system of computable problems. The fragmentation of the image echoes the frag-
mentation of the world.
The question  “Can machines think?” that Alan Turing asked himself soon 
inspired many other questions. The American sci-fi writer Philip K. Dick famously 
asked “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?” while neuroscientist David Marr inves-
tigated the question  “Can machines see?” Marr believed that human vision can be simu-
lated by computers.166 Deconstructing human vision into computable problems, he laid 
the foundations of the computational theory of vision and machine vision.167 
In computational optics, vision is defined as “a process that produces from 
images of the external world a description that is useful to the viewer and not cluttered 
with irrelevant information.”168 The notion of light as truth is taken out of the picture. 
A good vision is not necessarily a truthful one. Rather a good vision is reflected by the 
usefulness of the representation it produces, which in turn depends upon how well suited 
it is to a particular visual intention. Therefore, to Marr, advanced vision, like human 
vision, is not inherently superior to the simpler vision of rabbits and house flies. 
162　A Turing machine is essentially a theoretical state machine made up of a head that reads and writes data and a tape that stores data.
163　Alan Turing developed the thesis with his teacher and mathematician Alonzo Church. There are various equivalent formulations of 
the Church-Turing thesis. A common one is that every effective computation can be carried out by a Turing machine.
164　Galton, Antony. The Church-Turing Thesis: Its Nature and Status. Department of Computer Science, University of Exeter, 1992. p.161
165　Flusser, Vilém. Towards a Philosophy of Photography. Reaktion Books, 1983








Under the paradigm of computational vision, human visual perception is 
divided into three main groups of questions:169 (1) computational theory, which examines 
the mechanism and intention of visual perception, what is computed and why; (2) repre-
sentations and algorithm, which analyzes the process of visual perception and how an 
algorithm can transform sensations into representations; and (3) apparatus, which looks 
at the hardware implementation of visual perception, the physical device. For example, in 
reading a line of text, a useful human vision (1) discerns individual alphabets, combines 
them into words and sentences and extracts meaning from the text. The process is oper-
ated through (2) edge detection, which extracts the text from the page and then identi-
fies each shape into alphabets. Lastly, visual sensation began physically (3) at the eyeball, 
where signals are transmitted through the optic nerve to the visual cortex to be inter-
preted and constructed into an image. Marr shifted the focus away from the classical 
ontological anxiety towards a more practical approach to vision. Instead of  “What is 
vision and what is an image?”, he asked, “How can vision be formulated into a comput-
able question for a machine to create a useful representation with the least amount of 
irrelevant information?”
His theory of computational optics signalled an algorithmic turn170 in the 
thinking of vision and images; a development in image culture that I like to call, and to 
quote Heather Dewey-Hagborg,  “generative representationalism.”171 The ‘truth claim’ of 
generative representationalism, emerging after mechanical representationalism, lies not 
in the Cartesian metaphysics of light nor the indexicality of the light-sensitive surface 
but in data and algorithms. Generative representationalism encompasses two levels of 
seemingly contrasting approaches towards the image. On a superficial level, it suggests 
that the world can be disassembled into particle-like pixels, turned into a 2D-matrix of 
data points then recombined by the computer to a human-understandable visual image.
The Opportunity rover, part of NASA’s Mars mission program, is equipped 
with thirteen sensors to survey Mars’ geology. The digital photographic plate, or the 
CCD, precisely measures the quantity and quality (wavelengths) of photons that hits 
it. The thirteen carefully chosen color filters, considered particularly useful for seeing 
specific geological features, allow the collection of different types of data in the same 
shot.172 This data is then color-coded in red, blue and green channels and recombined 
into a photogenic image of Mars’ landscape.173
169　Ibid. p.25
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172　Vertesi, Janet. Seeing like a Rover: How Robots, Teams, and Images Craft Knowledge of Mars. The University of Chicago Press, 2015.
173　Mars Exploration Rover Opportunity, Downward Slope, sol 131, June 6, 2004
The Pillars of Creation,174 a photograph taken by the 
Hubble Space Telescope of elephant trunks of interstellar gas and 
dust in the Eagle Nebula, is composed of 32 images from four 
different cameras. Each camera captured light of different wave-
lengths emitted by different elements in the cloud. The data is then 
represented in different colors in the composite image: green for 
hydrogen, red for singly ionized sulfur and blue for double-ion-
ized oxygen atoms.175 Using this technique, NASA is able to create 
awe-inspiringly colourful photos of parts of the universe where 
an optical telescope would simply see a dull haze. These pictur-
esque, false color universes exemplify the practice in which digital 
images operate in a similar way to photographs. Pixels are forced 
into the mould of a photographic surface, on which a human-cen-
tric realism is maintained. At this level, the aesthetic of digital 
images is still largely defined by the human eye.176
But the digitalization of images also points to a funda-
mental reformulation in the relationship between the image, the 
world and the humans that live among them. For the scientists 
studying Cercidilla, a crater ejecta on Mars' Victoria Crater, the 
realism of the image captured by the Opportunity rover does 
not stem from the visual representation of the rock. The lighting 
and geometry of the photo were more important to them than 
compositional differences in studying the crater’s staritography 
because the previous contains data in the pixels that allows scien-
tists to measure the exact, shapes, sizes, and depths of the crevices 
on the cliff face.177 The referent of a digital image is not the event 
or object depicted but data itself. It signifies a huge shift in the 
understanding of an image.
“Insofar as it makes any sense to talk of a digitally produced 
image as some kind of ‘copy’ of the data out of which it is made, it 
is a visible copy of an invisible original, since it is the digital data 
174　Hubble Telescope, Pillars of Creation, 1995. Courtesy of Hubble Heritage Team/ESA/NASA
175　Hubble news release, “Embryonic Stars Emerge from Interstellar.” Hubble Site
176　Manovich, Lev. The Language of New Media. MIT Press, 2010. p.182
177　Vertesi, Janet. Seeing like a Rover: How Robots, Teams, and Images Craft Knowledge of Mars. 





that plays the role of the original here, rather than the situation or 
event that is depicted, which is its more distant, shadowy 
source.” 178
A digital image is an “artefact soup”179 and, as such, 
requires a skilled vision to translate it into something mean-
ingful. This vision could belong to an expert or be embodied by 
image-processing algorithms, such as in the case of images of 
Cercidilla. The production of a ‘meaningful’ digital image works 
under a stretched temporality; its focus moves from the ‘click 
of a shutter’ in analog photography to image processing. Or to 
reiterate this idea another way, by using Osborne’s terminology, 
the event of capture and the event of visualization180 now happen 
in an extended timeline. This stretched temporality is evident 
in popular digital photography, where one of the most common 
convention photographers are told to follow is to always shoot in 
RAW. This golden rule is often underpinned by the reasoning that 
the RAW format gives photographers more data to ‘work’ with,' 
so that during the post-production process, there is more leeway 
for adjustments in image-editing software. Understood this way, 
digital photographs are Wittgenstein’s gestalt figures.181 They are 
ambiguous pictures that need the interpretation of an external 
agent to further narrow down a few meanings from multiple 
possibilities.182 Although sometimes coincidentally photogenic 
and pleasing to the human eye, “we have to remember that it is 
not only image quality that distinguishes digital from analog, it is 
data, the code itself.”183 
Another interpretation of generative representation-
alism is similar to the first level but without the final product: a 
visual image that is intelligible to humans. Here, a digital image 
178　Osborne, Peter. Infinite Exchange: The Social Ontology of the Photographic Image. Philosophy of 
Photography, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 2010, p.65
179　Vertesi. Seeing like a Rover: How Robots, Teams, and Images Craft Knowledge of Mars. p.77
180　Ibid, p.64
181　Jastrow, Joseph. ‘The duck/rabbit’, 1900. Wittgenstein used this image to illustrate “the dawning 
of aspect”: a change in the organization of visual experience. A picture can be ‘seen as’ a duck or a 
rabbit, just as the world can be seen in one way or the other.
182　Ibid, p.79
183　Steyerl, Hito. “In Defense of the Poor Image.” e-Flux
is not merely a surface of visual representation for the human eye 
but rather as a datamap, a 3D point cloud184 or a textural pattern. 
An image is simultaneously a matrix of data and a visual repre-
sentation generated by data. The pattern-recognition machine 
WiSARD, developed by scientist Igor Aleksander in the 1980s, 
could recognize individual human faces. It is the world’s first 
patented artificial neural network machine. In a 1983 BBC docu-
mentary,185 his colleagues took turns sitting in front of a camera 
connected to the computer. Pixelated monochrome images of 
their faces flashed onto the computer screens and, following a 
slight delay, the computer recognized them. “Hello, Bruce,” the 
computer said in a monotonous voice. Another man entered.  
This time the computer ‘saw’ a face that was not in the system 
and shouted: “Intruder! Intruder!”
It almost seemed as though Aleksander’s machine has 
answered Marr’s question:“Can machines see?” But it would be 
a mistake to call what the machine did seeing. Computer vision, 
a love-child of machine-learning and photography, is “pure 
statistic.”186 For a computer to ‘see’, or to perform semantic 
segmentation,187 it carries out an algorithm developed using deep 
learning. Deep learning is a training process which involves a 
neural network comprising an input image, layers and output 
results. Layers of simple feature detectors and high-level feature 
detectors are trained on millions of human-labeled images. This 
process involves people painstakingly identifying objects and 
circling them from the image pixel by pixel. The machine ‘learns’ 
by back-propagating errors until the network gets the answer 
right. When the computer can pick up the pattern, it can begin to 
identify the elements of a photograph autonomously. To put it in 
another way, the machine computes the relationship between the 
questions (the input image) and the answers (the identifier). The 
184　A point cloud is a set of data points in space. Usually a result a 3D scanning, the assemblage of 
data points gives the impression of a 3D space.
185　Video still of the 1983 BBC Documentary
186　Süsstrunk, Sabine. Panelist, Panel discussion. Symposium “A Mass Stake: From Photo 
Dissemination to Archive Management”, 3rd July 2019, Les Rencontres d'Arles, Arles, France
187　Semantic segmentation is a computer vision jargon referring to an image analysis task that 





result is pattern recognition. Computer vision, thus, is the process 
of which the machine associates certain combinations of patterns 
with a specific semantic conclusion. A computer isn’t seeing: it 
is merely using brute force to solve a computable problem which 
humans called vision. Anna Ridler explores the crucial practice of 
labelling in computer vision in her work Myriad (Tulips) (2018).188 
The photographer created her own dataset by hand-labelling over 
10,000 of photographs of Tulips into categories: “red or other 
colours”, “budding or blooming”, “strips or no strips”. Exper-
imenting with labelling, she found a way to control the images 
generated by the neural network. 
The recent advent of computer vision has highlighted 
the process of labelling, but this practice of injecting data into 
images has its roots much deeper in the past. Photography 
researcher Estelle Blaschke described the coexistence of data and 
images by looking at the development of image storage medium. 
The invention of microfilm and Eastman Kodak’s Recordak 
system189 in the 1920s pioneered an efficient way to store and 
reproduce documents on 16mm and 35mm film rolls. Contracts, 
patents and other important papers were photographed onto 
microfilm. In the event of damage or loss of the original docu-
ment, the photographic record could be used to reproduce the 
document using an enlarger embedded in Kodak’s system. Subse-
quently, the large amount of data stored in films called for an 
image retrieval system.190 In 1932, German chemist and engineer 
Emanuel Goldberg proposed a method for using optics and the 
photoelectric cell to retrieve indexed documents stored on film. 
His method involves dots or alphanumeric code on microfilms, a 
‘search template’ and a ‘light-bulb selector’. For the retrieval of 
the document, the search template is put in front of the film reel, 
which is illuminated and turned at high-speed until both match. 
The use of the data that is encoded onto film is the basis of the 
188　Ridler, Anna. Myriad (Tulips), 2018. Courtesy of the artist
189　Recordak Corporation. Ad print of Eastman Kodak Recordak microfilm systems catalog, 1968, 
retreived online
190　Blaschke, Estelle. “From Microform to the Drawing Bot: The Photographic Image as Data.” Grey 
Room, vol. 75, 2019, pp. 60–83., p.34
image ‘search engine’. 
Retrieval technologies kept improving to adapt to the 
dominant medium of later eras. The inception of Miracode, used 
in Kodak’s Business Systems,191 not only boosted the speed and 
accuracy of the retrieval, but also extended the scope of infor-
mation that could be retrieved. The code de-materializes the 
mechanical retrieval systems that were largely based on micro-
film, minicard and hand-written indexes. The advancement in 
image-retrieval technology made possible the invention of image 
banks, such as Corbis images, in the 1990s. The Bill-Gates-
backed pioneering image bank heralded the evolution from index 
cards to digital metadata. With digital metadata, the amount of 
data stored behind the visible surface increased substantially. 
The labelling of images becomes the foundation on which Google 
Image search and newer image banks such as Getty Images and 
EyeEm are based on, which in turn makes the compilation of 
training datasets for computer vision much more efficient. Data 
becomes an integral part of a digital image, perhaps as important 
as, if not more important, than the visual representation. It defines 
the meaning of an image and even the existence of an image, for it 
determines whether the image can be retrieved from an archive or 
whether it will be forever lost in the ocean of images.
We have reached a full circle that begins with Igor’s 
seeing machine, continues onwards with a brief historical review 
on the coexistence of data and image only to return to computer 
vision. What defines the invention of computer vision as a water-
shed moment in our image culture is not that the machines can 
see, but rather the development of the invisible infrastructure 
that enables it—data and algorithms. Digital images are infused 
with data, data to be read and computed by machines through an 
opaque process incomprehensible to humans. Some describe them 
as ‘black-box algorithms’. The process is imprinted in the psyche-
delic colours and uncanny eyes of a DeepDream image of Van 
Gogh’s Starry Night.192 We instantly identify the famous painting 
191　The system is an updated Recordak adapted to modern office management






in the image, but what Google engineer Alexander Mordvintsev 
showed is something else. The alien textures on the images are the 
traces of computer vision, the process of how computers recog-
nize patterns. Mordvintsev explored computer vision through 
the Flusserian counter vision. DeepDream gave us a rare glimpse 
of the inside of the apparatus; one that is slowly slipping out of 
human comprehension. Perhaps the uneasiness that catches us off 
guard when we look at a DeepDream image is down to the fact 
that we are, consciously or unconsciously, becoming self-aware 
that images are increasingly detached from human perception.
We are no longer the sole producers of images, nor are 
we the sole audience of images. Self-driving cars, facial recogni-
tion, Microsoft’s text-to-image drawing bots;193 all are trained 
with image datasets to identify other images. These technologies 
imply that more and more images are produced by, and created 
for, machines. Speaking about his latest project A Study of Invisible 
Images, in which he tackles the topic of computer vision, Trevor 
Paglen attempts to broaden the contemporary discourse on 
photography. “The traditional discourses that we have to think 
about photographs seem useless today,” he says in an interview.194 
Surveying the territory of ‘machine vision’, Paglen shone light 
on what he terms ‘invisible images’—images made by machines 
for other machines—to unveil the ‘black-box algorithms’ behind 
the pictorial surfaces. The images Paglen shown ranged from 
completely abstract, eerily human-like195 to photogenic.
One of these ‘invisible images’ might have been found 
at the Fluid Dynamics of Disease Transmission Laboratory at 
MIT.196 To build a model of spray physics, Lydia Bourouiba led 
a group of researchers to capture high-speed video footage of 
water splashes197 on different surfaces, such as leaves. The photo-
193　The Microsoft’s drawing bot was trained on datasets that contain paired images and captions, 
which allow the models to learn how to match words to the visual representation of those words. The 
GAN, for example, learns to generate an image of a bird when a caption says bird and, likewise, learns 
what a picture of a bird should look like.
194　Bridle, James. “Episode 2: Machine Visions”, New Ways of Seeing, 24th April 2019
195　Paglen, Trevor. “Fanon” (Even the Dead Are Not Safe) Eigenface, 2017
196　Chu, Jennifer, and MIT News Office. “New Theory Describes Intricacies of a Splashing Droplet.” 
MIT News, 16 May 2018
197　Fluid Dynamics of Disease Transmission Laboratory, Droplet’s Rim, 2019, Courtesy of the 
researchers
genic slow-motion crown-splash video is reminiscent of Harold 
Edgerton’s Milk Drop Coronet, but unlike Edgerton, these videos 
are not made for the human eye. The imagery captured by the 
state-of-the-art high-speed camera was sent to the image-anal-
ysis algorithms developed by the team. The algorithms auto-
matically extract and measure the features of the fluid breakup 
processes, such as the rim thickness of the splash, features that 
are otherwise indiscernible by humans. With the aid of the algo-
rithms, the researchers discovered a pattern through analysing 
videos of droplets. The machine deciphers the hidden information 
of an image that is invisible to the human subject.
Artist Zachery Norman reversed Bourouiba’s visual-
izing logic by injecting data into the image. Behind every trippy 
false-colour image in Endangered Data (2017) is a year’s worth 
of measurement of meteorological data stored in the respec-
tive measuring station depicted in each of his image. Following 
the footsteps of scientists, librarians and laypeople who have 
taken up the task of backing up publicly available government 
datasets after the 2016 election results—driven by the fear that 
the incoming US president and climate denier Donald Trump 
would destroy the evidence of human-induced global warming—
Norman injects data into his image using a cryptographic tech-
nique known as steganography. The technique, used to store or 
hide information within the pixels of digital images, creates the 
distinctive appearance of the image.198 In this way, Norman pres-
ents two landscapes in a single digital image: one that is visible 
to human eyes and one that is accessible only to machines. His 
six books, which is a small facet of a much larger ecology of 
machine-generated and machine-readable images, prompts us to 
reassess our mastery over representation. We can find the same 
line of thought in Paula Kupfer’s introduction to Drew Nikono-
wicz’s work This World and Others Like It.





“Within the contemporary wilderness, robots have replaced 
photographers as mediators producing images completely dislo-
cated from human experience. This suggests that now the sublime 
landscape is only accessible through the boundaries of technology.”
What can we make out of all this talk about images and 
data? Willian Uricchio’s notion of ‘the algorithmic turn’ quite 
succinctly crystallises the algorithmic intervention between 
the viewing subject and the object viewed. He suggests that the 
union of image and data heralded a new way of representing the 
world, a way that “refracts the subject-centered world charted 
by Descartes.”199 
Uricchio’s view is mirrored in The Babel Image Archives,200 
a webpage that claims to contain all the possible images in the 
world. The web application permutes 4096 colours on a pixel 
grid with 416 rows and 640 columns. The title is a homage to 
Jorge Luis Borges' short story The Library Of Babel, which describes 
a universal library containing every possible permutation of 410 
pages of letters, thus everything that ever has been or ever could 
be written. Since the whole process is randomized, what the user 
usually gets is a noisy “artefact soup”, although in some very rare 
occasions, the colours and the pixels might just align in the right 
pattern to form a digital representation of Van Gogh’s Starry 
Night, or the face of Kirsch’s three-month-old son. The Library Of 
Babel teaches us about infinity just as much as it teaches us that 
a ‘meaningful’ image is just one of the infinite possibilities an 
apparatus can produce. To the apparatus, an “artefact soup” is no 
less important than the face of an infant. They are all serendipi-
tous combinations of colored pixels, readable and computable by 
machines—one of the many possibilities of the apparatus. 
For a long time, the image an apparatus produced was 
largely defined by human sight. The significance of an image 
depends on how people find meaning in them. With each refresh, 
199　Uricchio, William. “The Algorithmic Turn: Photosynth, Augmented Reality and the Changing 
Implications of the Image.” Visual Studies, vol. 26, no. 1, 2011, pp. 25–35.
200　Babelia, babelia #5882212427991338, 2019. The image of black hole can be found at babelia 
#2480667808...6607719849 of the library
the website reassigns a new colour to each pixel on the grid, churning out as many 









After clicking on the ‘bake’ button in the interface, the grey 
sphere suspended in midair began to slowly descend. The sphere 
on the screen hits another square slab, the ‘water tank’, equally 
grey and suspended. At first, a small protrusion rises up from the 
dent it has made on the ‘water tank’, then a few seconds later, 
as the computer finish rendering another frame, the protrusion 
extends. The motion continues, the protrusion reaches its climax 
and there it is: a splash inside a computer.201 
How is a simulated water splash different from a ‘real’ 
one? What is the relationship between a computer simulation 
and our lived world? We might be tempted to conclude that 
because the water splash on the screen resembles, for example, 
Edgerton’s photograph of a milk coronet, a simulation is 
related to our lived world in the same way a camera captures 
an image—a direct transcription of the world. Thus, we may 
assume that the computer will simulate a water splash using 
the same laws that govern physical phenomena. Given the same 
input (the size and height of the water drop, the size and depth 
of the water tank), the computer would simulate a replica of the 
‘real’ water splash repeatedly and without deviation. However, 
as we have learnt from previous chapters, a representational 
perspective only provides a very limited understanding of an 
image. On the software interface, there is no size, height, depth, 
gravity nor any of the other common properties used in physics 
equations, replacing them instead are ‘optimization’, ‘grid levels’, 
‘slip type’ and ‘fluid particles’.
Examining the apparatus at its technical limits is often 
helpful for regaining a clear view of the image. The simulated 
water splash is a technical image. Beyond the assemblage of pixels 
on the screen lies a unique para-image. Among many other ‘parti-
cles’, making up the para-image are two foundational concepts of 
simulation: ‘parametrics’ and ‘cellular automata’.202 Parametrics 
relates to the human effort to translate observations from our 
201　A sequence of a water splash generated from fluid simulation in Blender
202　Keller, Evelyn Fox. Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, 
Metaphors, and Machines. Harvard University Press, 2003.
lived experience into a computer-readable format. It involves the 
discretization of worldly phenomena into computable information 
bits as well as other necessary algorithmic techniques to maintain 
a stable simulation. ‘Cellular automata’ describes the machine’s 
ability as a “universe synthesizer”.203 The autonomy of simulation 
to self-evolve according to simple rules,204 however, often creates 
unpredictable results. Parametrics and cellular automata are two 
parts of a feedback loop that makes simulations possible. Humans 
leverage on the machine’s brute force computing power to solve 
differential equations; machines rely on algorithms developed by 
humans to maintain stability. Parametrics construct the algo-
rithmic treatments that encode the physical world for the model 
to synthesize results, but at the same time, they provide an ad-hoc 
algorithmic solution to patch technical errors. This combination 
of human and machine agency formulates a new relationship 
between the world and the image, one that is recursive, iterative 
and contingent.
The endeavour of Norman Phillips and Akio Arakawa 
to model the Earth’s atmosphere using computer simulation 
exemplifies the intertwined relationship between humankind and 
machines in the production of an image. Both meteorologists 
were searching for an approach to modelling, experimenting 
with different ways of translating the physical phenomenon into 
computable problems in the 1950s. Phillips developed his simu-
lation based on six equations from theoretical models of atmo-
spheric wind and pressure relations.205 His simulation ran as 
expected initially, but the dynamic of his atmosphere remained 
unstable. The system ‘exploded’ into chaos in merely 4 weeks.206 
This signals a fundamental gap between theory and discrete 
simulation models that forbids the direct imitation of phys-
ical phenomena. Phillips’ model was successful in two ways: he 
203　Ibid
204　A cellular automaton is a collection of "colored" cells on a grid of specified shape that evolves 
through a number of discrete time steps according to a set of rules based on the states of neighboring 
cells. Fox-Keller uses the term to describe the nature of simulation.
205　Lenhard, Johannes. “Computer Simulation: The Cooperation Between Experimenting And 





formulated the right primitive equations (theory207) and devised the subsequent connec-
tions among them (model). However, his focus of transcoding human knowledge into 
the computer has not yielded him a stable simulation.
Phillips’ failure shows that the production of a successful computer simulation 
is more than theory and model. The process necessitates both human and machine intel-
ligence, and an approach that treats both parties as active agents. A computer simulation 
involves both the human transcoding of physical phenomena into computable data and 
the synthesis of a virtual environment through the machine’s cellular automata. Contrary 
to Phillips’ work, Arakawa’s approach emphasises the simulation’s ability to imitate 
phenomena in the atmosphere rather than solving theoretical equations.208 Despite being 
well-versed in mathematics, he permitted contradictions in the primitive equations in 
order to better imitate the atmosphere. He introduced additional unempirical mathe-
matical artefacts (treatment and solver) to ensure the system would remain stable in the 
long-term. Surprisingly, his quasi-empirical approach allowed him to produce a stable 
and usable simulation.
These patchwork algorithms, referred to as ‘discretization scheme’209 and 
‘parametrics’,210 are now standard when building computer simulations. Sometimes, 
a “parameter is a kind of proxy—a stand-in for something that cannot be modelled 
directly but can still be estimated, or at least guessed.”211 Other times, they act as lubri-
cants that overcome computational friction212 by simplifying physical processes too small 
to be modelled directly. Parameters such as ‘cloud fraction’213 and  ‘eddy viscosity’214  
allow the simulation to stay relatively consistent in simulating larger-scale meteoro-
logical phenomena, without overcrowding the computer with irrelevant calculations. 
However, the parameters have no theoretical foundation. In other words, many parame-
ters are not physically based, but these numerical artefacts are crucial to the stability of 
the simulation. Paul E. Edwards summarizes the use of parameters:
207　The five components of simulation Winsberg identified are: Theory, Model, Treatment, Solver and Results
208　Johannes. “Computer Simulation: The Cooperation Between Experimenting And Modeling*". 
209　Winsberg, Eric B. Science in the Age of Computer Simulation. University of Chicago Press, 2010.
210　Edwards, Paul N. A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming. MIT Press, 2013.
211　Ibid.
212　Paul N Edwards uses the term computational friction to refer to the resistance that opposes the transformation of data into 
knowledge. It includes the physical and economic limits on processor speed and memory capacity as well as human work involved in 
programming and operating the computer.
213　Scientists would assign a “cloud fraction” to estimate the percentage of each grid box covered by clouds, rather than calculating it 
directly from convection columns, condensation nuclei, and their other physical causes. The simplification of the physical phenomenon 
makes it more manageable for computer to execute simulation.
214　The parameter is used in meteorologist Robert Wilhelmson’s thunderstorm simulation. Eddy viscosity is a mathematical tool 
scientists invented to approximate the effect of tiny-scale vortices that is unresolvable by computational grid. The parameter allows the 
simulation to stay relatively consistent with accurate representation of the larger-scale meteorological phenomenon, without overcrowding 
the computer with irrelevant calculations.
“Modelers develop parameterizations by reviewing observational 
data and the meteorological literature. They identify the range 
of observed values and try to find relationships between small-
scale processes and the large-scale independent variables in their 
models. When they succeed in finding such relations, they call the 
resulting parameters ‘physically-based’. Often, however, they do 
not find direct links to large-scale physical variables. In this quite 
common case, modelers invent ad-hoc schemes that provide the 
models with the necessary connections.” 215
Among computer programmers, the ad-hoc parame-
ters are referred to as ‘Kluge’. A Kluge is a colloquial term that 
describes sections of code that were functional but unprinci-
pled, inelegant, and ill-understood.216 A simulation combines 
two seemingly contrasting methodologies; part of the process 
is grounded in empirical experience and theoretical models in 
physics. Another part of the process relies on parameters. By 
forging nonexistent connections between real-life phenomenon 
and virtual variables, these contingent mathematical schemes 
serve as the operational backbone of simulations. 
The parameterization of the world and the autonomy of 
simulation dissolve the conventional epistemological paradigm 
that divides the scientifically-sound from the imaginary, ‘real’ 
from ‘fictional’.217 Underpinned modern computer simulation is 
the acceptance of uncertainty—both in the physical world and 
in computation. Edward Lorenz learnt that chaos is in the nature 
of many world phenomena as he was experimenting with meteo-
rological simulations. He later summarized his findings in chaos 
theory which describes the unpredictability of chaotic systems. 
Many phenomena are, in fact, not deterministic. Alan Turing’s 
halting problem218 proves that there are problems unsolvable by 
deterministic machines such as computers. It is uncertain whether 
215　Edwards. A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming. 
p.341
216　Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation. p.109
217　Yiu, Sheung. Water Splash on Water Splash. 2019.
218　In computability theory, the halting problem is the problem of determining, from a description of 




a programme will provide answers. What we can do at that moment is to throw educated 
guesses. The second-best response to this uncertainty is parameterization.
Parameterization signifies the limit of human knowledge. It entails accepting 
and absorbing fictionality into a world in which empiricism and logic are held as the 
virtues of truth. Parameterization is a counterpoint to the Cartesian subject. The rise of 
simulation has engendered a re-evaluation of the human-centric nature of almost every 
concept; the notion of the world, reality, knowledge, technology, apparatuses and images. 
Replacing it is a posthuman understanding of image ecology grounded in uncertainty 
and human-machine symbioses. We need to work with machines to access our reality 
through images. Our intelligence is neither superior nor inferior to that of a machine; 
the two simply have different roles in the practice. We work symbiotically as one appa-
ratus. Simulation obliterates the notion of an all-knowing human subject and the idea of 
absolute knowledge. Rather, it leans towards a pragmatic theory of truth,  “a reliability 
without truth”.219  This pragmatism has materialized in the contemporary development 
of AI and computer vision in which we partially disengage from theories and accept 
inexplicable elements—such as black-box algorithms—as long as they spit out mean-
ingful results. 
Just as telescopes have a limit to their resolving power,220 simulation, like any 
other apparatus, has a limit to its ‘resolution’. We tend to think that simulation is a 
computationally generated version of the real world based on the same principle, but 
simulation is indeed its own universe governed by a different set of rules, driven by the 
human desire to imitate our world. To borrow Flusser’s lexicon, computer simulation is 
the world abstracted, on one hand by theories (linear texts that abstract the physics of 
the lived world), and on the other by algorithmic modelling (linear text that abstract the 
‘physics’ of the virtual world). The image is not a deterministic one, rather it might be a 
coincidental resemblance. A simulated image is a mirage, a refraction of our world.
Likewise, the simulation of a water splash conjured up by my computer belongs 
to a new type of technical image; one that reformulates a relation between the image and 
the world unlike any other that came before it.221 This gesture of image-making is “doubly 
self-involved, from an intricate opposition and collaboration between the inventor and 
the manipulator of the apparatus and an opposition and collaboration between an appa-
ratus and a human being.”222 For one, whereas a photograph refers to a ‘there-has-been’ 
in the world and digital image refers to data, the referent of a simulation is a mathe-
219　Winsberg, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation
220　The ability of optical equipment to discern two close together images as being separate.
221　Yiu, Sheung. Photo Installation. 2019.
222　Flusser Vilém, et al. Into the Universe of Technical Images. University of Minnesota Press, 2011. p.20
matical model. In Flusser’s Into The Universe of Technical Images, the 
philosopher characterizes five “rungs” of knowledge transmis-
sion throughout human history wherein each rung the mediation 
reaches a new level of abstraction. These “rungs” can be briefly 
summarized diagrammatically as: actions – objects – traditional 
images – linear text – technical images.223 The traditional image is 
an observation of an object, and the technical image is a concept 
computed in an apparatus.224 In the fifth rung: “Texts have 
recently shown themselves to be inaccessible. They don’t permit 
any further pictorial mediation. They have become unclear. They 
collapse into particles that must be gathered up. This is the level 
of calculation and computation, the level of technical images.”225 
A simulation occupies a new level of abstraction outside of the 
five rungs. The sixth rung, as Marcel Cadaval Pereira called it, 
is the age of virtual interactive media. This level of abstraction 
features “non-existent (virtual) tools manipulated by multiple 
characters, generating multiple possible results.”226 At this level, 
images are work-in-progress objects which do not have a static 
final form. They are always subject to change from the reac-
tion-loop between human and the apparatus. A water splash can 
shapeshift into any other water splash calculable by the model as 
the user changes the data input. A simulated crown splash depicts 
a discrete instance created by a mathematical model. It is neither 
a direct representation of the real-world water splash nor of the 
whole mathematical model. 
For another, we shall focus back on the first part of 
Pereira’s definition of the sixth rung — “non-existent (virtual) 
tools manipulated by multiple characters”.227 Referencing Wind-
berg’s simulation timeline, we can deconstruct the production of 
a simulation into multiple agencies: (1) a theorizing agent that 
transcodes observations in the real world into physical properties 
e.g. mass and velocity, (2) an agent, usually human, that trans-
223　Pereira, Marcel Cadaval et al., The Sixth Rung, Flusser Studies 22, p1-12
224　Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images
225　Flusser, Into the Universe of Technical Images
226　Pereira, The Sixth Rung
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governed by an ad-hoc scheme of mathematical modelling. Its autonomy brings unprec-
edented interactivity to an image. The technical images it produces are manifestations of 
the interaction between humans and machines.
Viewing the image through three apparatuses side-by-side, we are then able to 
break away from the Platonic model of images that binds us to the world of representa-
tion and objective reproduction. In every apparatus lies a different agenda; images enter 
different circuits and the distinction between the real and the copy becomes irrelevant. 
The image has a life of its own. More than a representation, it is the reality; it engenders 
reality. Reality is not ‘real’ but a well-tempered harmony of simulations. Put in another 
way, the image is ‘realer than real’.  As Deleuze elaborates:
“Simulation does not replace reality... but rather it appropriates reality in the operation 
of despotic overcoding, it produces reality on the new full body that replaces the earth. It 
expresses the appropriation and production of the real by a quasi-cause.” 233
If images are, as Flusser said, “signposts directed outward”,234 then we should 
not be distracted by their signs, but rather turn our eyes to the directions they point 
towards. One direction is the dismantling of anthropocentrism in the discourse of 
images. On one hand, phenomenology challenges us to scrutinize the notion of absolute 
knowledge. Rationality and objectivity which prioritize an independent human subject 
comes into questions as human vision is more complex than it was once thought. Images 
are objects of human perception rather than representations of reality. 
On the other hand, the emergence of new media restructures the mediation 
of human experience. The traditional McLuhanian idea235 that media is a prosthetic 
of human sensory organs no longer holds. The cellular automata of simulation, or the 
capacity to perform according to its own laws, marks the moment “in the history of 
technical media in which human experience is left behind.”236 Parametrics, data and 
algorithms break down the world into bytes, which are then fed into the machines 
as their sensory inputs. The result is that computers now mediate a world rendered 
through its own perception, one that is incomprehensible by humans. Once the tech-
nical inscription of human experience, the media now gains an agency. Today mediation 
entails a task of “composing the relations between technical circuits and human experi-
233　Massumi, Brian. Realer than real: The Simulacrum According to Deleuze and Guattari. From Copyright no.1, 1987, p. 90-97. 
234　Flusser, Vilém, et al. Into the Universe of Technical Images. University of Minnesota Press, 2011.
235　McLuhan, Marshall, et al. The Medium Is the Massage. Penguin, 2008.
236　Hansen, Mark B. N. Feed-Forward: on the Future of Twenty-First-Century Media. University of Chicago Press, 2015. iBooks. p.42
ence.”237 An image is a medium no longer restricted to tracing human experiences, but 
one that includes “everything that happens when machines interact with other machines 
in today’s complex media networks, everything that happens when human interface with 
these networks and also, of course, everything that happens when human self-reflect on 
these interactions.”238 
“What transpires is a doubling or splitting of media’s operationality: on one hand, twen-
ty-first-century media mediate the sensory continuum in which all experience, human 
included, occurs; on the other, twenty-first-century media function as media for humans—
as media in its traditional sense—when and insofar as they presentify the data of sensibility 
in ways that humans can perceive.” 
The twenty-first-century-media Hansen describes implies that humans are not 
the sole producers and sole audience of images any more; there are instances when we 
must work with machines to complete certain images and, by extension, our lived expe-
rience. The human experience is just one of the many experiences new media is capable of 
mediating. In some cases, an image is produced for us to understand the machine’s expe-
rience. For example, a visualization of a simulated model. In this process, human vision 
is displaced from the throne of visual culture and epistemological structure. Replacing it 
is a stereoscopic vision, where humans and machines must collaborate as an apparatus 
to negotiate and decipher the meaning of an image. 
Another direction these technical images point towards is a new understanding 
of reality, which Barad aptly named “agential realism”.239 Underpinning this non-repre-
sentational realism is the blurry boundaries between the human subject and the observed 
object. This idea, raised by phenomenologists in the early twentieth century, become 
the focus of debate in a vastly different discourse— quantum physics. Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle and Niel Bohr’s thought experiments highlight the interaction of 
the apparatus with the measured object. Bohr disproves the notion of an independent 
reality. The reality of the measured object, in Bohr’s case the position or momentum of 
a particle, depends on the apparatus set-up. The momentum of a particle can be deter-
mined by a moving apparatus but not a non-moving apparatus. Theoretical concepts are 
not idealistic in nature but rather a consequence of a specific  physical arrangement. That 
is to say, the apparatus, the observer and the observed are entangled. There is no clarity 
237　Ibid, p.43
238　Ibid
239　Barad, Karen Michelle. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Duke 
University Press, 2007.
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between the object and the agencies of observations. The world is not a combination of 
independent realities but the result of the intra-actions of various agencies. In Barad’s 
own words:
“In my agential realist account, scientific practices do not reveal what is already there; 
rather, what is ‘disclosed’’ is the effect of the intra-active engagements of our participation 
with/in and as part of the world’s differential becoming. Which is not to say that humans 
are the condition of possibility for the existence of phenomena. Phenomena do not require 
cognizing minds for their existence; on the contrary, ‘minds’’ are themselves material 
phenomena that emerge through specific intra-actions. Phenomena are real material beings. 
What is made manifest through technoscientific practices is an expression of the objective 
existence of particular material phenomena. This is, after all, a realist conception of scien-
tific practices. But unlike in traditional conceptions of realism, ‘objectivity’ is not preexis-
tence (in the ontological sense) or the preexistent made manifest to the cognitive mind (in 
the epistemological sense). Objectivity is a matter of accountability for what materializes, for 
what comes to be. It matters which cuts are enacted: different cuts enact different material-
ized becomings.” 240
The image, being a worldly object, operates under the same framework. Images 
are not representations of the world, they are part of the world. They are the product of 
apparatuses, “boundary-drawing practices —specific material (re)configurations of the 
world—which come to matter.”241 They themselves are also apparatuses and phenomena. 
This is not merely a theoretical invention, or meant to be a cheap provocation, but a 
lived reality. Our obsession with selfies and spectacles, the surveillance technology 
and Deepfake videos enabled by computer vision, the Event Horizon Telescope that 
produced the first image of a black hole, the simulations which climate change research 
relies on: all of these images point to an entangled web of images, humans and the world. 
Like the particle in Bohr’s experiment, the ‘reality’ of the image depends on the arrange-
ment of agencies. Under a representational apparatus, an image is a mirror of the world. 
Seen through a phenomenological apparatus, an image affects the perception of self and 
reality. In a generative apparatus, an image is a manifestation of the interaction between 
humans and machines. 
An image is an object. The traditional understanding of image as a window to 
the world no longer suffices, failing to grasp the complexity of images in contemporary 
240　Ibid. p.361
241　Ibid. p.140
visual culture. More than a pictorial surface, an image is a manifestation of our interac-
tions with the world through an apparatus. An image is both an object and a represen-
tation. It has its own agency and ‘intra-acts’ with other entities in the world. An image 
is the Soviet battle tank IS-3 for Joseph Stalin: one moment it is put on a WWII memo-
rial pedestal, admired as a historical display; the next moment it is driven off from the 
pedestal and promptly goes to war.242 
The discourse on images should not stop at the visible part of an image. 
Para-images reveal that behind every image is an invisible belief system. This belief 
system determines what kind of images are created and what images have a significant 
relationship to us. It is also indicative of the configurations of different agencies, ideas 
and technical apparatuses that sustain our reality. They are manifestations of the struc-
ture of the world as it is, and they are the only way in which the world is.243 That is, the 
world is an image.
242　Steyerl, Hito. “A Tank on a Pedestal: Museums in an Age of Planetary Civil War.” e-Flux, Feb.
243　Hansen, Mark. “Logics of Futurity, or on the Physicality of Media” 2014 School of Criticism and Theory public lecture series, 30 





“When the water is impacted, it opens and the impacting drop bounces back. The water that was open, 
closes back as a wave converging toward the place where the place jumped up. All this water in reflective 
motion impacts on itself and jumps (following the first drop) and climbs behind it as if embracing it.”






“The splash of a drop is a transaction which is accomplished in the twinkling of an eye.”
The Splash of a Drop, Arthur Mason Worthington

“The modern stroboscope has achieved these desiderata, and under its revealing light it is now possi-
ble to see the exquisite splash formations with the unaided eye, to photograph them in daylight, and 
to take motion pictures for ultraslow projection.”
Harold Edgerton and James Rhyne Killian, Flash! 







“As a single raindrop falls to the ground, it can splash back up in a crown-like sheet, spraying small-
er droplets from its rim before sinking back to the surface — all in the blink of an eye.”







“Think of a fluid as a collection of boxes or cells. Each box has various properties, like velocity and 
density. These boxes interact with their neighbours, affecting their velocity and density. A real-world 
fluid can be seen as having a huge number of absolutely minuscule boxes, all interacting with their 
neighbours a zillion times a second.
 Of course, a real computer can’t handle a zillion interactions per second, nor can it 
handle a zillion little boxes, so we have to compromise. We’ll break the fluid up into a reasonable 
number of boxes and try to do several interactions per second.”




“Please note that the normal real-world viscosity (the so-called dynamic viscosity) is measured in 
Pascal- seconds (Pa.s), or in Poise units (P, equal to 0.1 Pa.s, pronounced pwaz, from the French-
man Jean-Louis Poiseuille, who discovered the laws on “the laminar flow of viscous fluids”), and 
commonly centiPoise units (cP, equal to 0.001 Pa.s, sentipwaz). Blender, on the other hand, uses 
the kinematic viscosity (which is dynamic viscosity in Pa.s, divided by the density





 int size; 
 float dt; 




 float *Vx; 
 float *Vy; 
 float *Vz;
 float *Vx0; 
 float *Vy0; 
 float *Vz0;
};
typedef struct FluidCube FluidCube; 
”
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